Nonprofit Capital: A Review of Problems and Strategies by William P. Ryan
prepared by William P. Ryan 
for The Rockefeller Foundation 
and Fannie Mae Foundation
Nonprofit Capital
A Review of Problems and Strategies
Nonprofit Capital
A Review of Problems and Strategies
Copyright © 2001 William P. Ryan
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Ryan, William P.
Nonprofit capital: a review of problems and strategies / prepared by
William P. Ryan / for Fannie Mae Foundation [and] The Rockefeller
Foundation.
p. cm.
1. Nonprofit organizations — Capitalization. 2. Charities —







A Review of Problems and Strategies
prepared by William P. Ryan
for The Rockefeller Foundation
and Fannie Mae Foundation
Author’s Note/ iv Nonprofit Capital: A Review of Problems and Strategies
I am grateful to the many people who agreed to be interviewed
for this paper; their examples, arguments and insights form the
core of this work.
Jane Preston, a consultant to nonprofits and a fellow at
the Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations at Harvard
University, provided invaluable research assistance.
Mike Sviridoff contributed critically important leads,
ideas and feedback throughout.
Ed Skloot and Vince Stehle of the Surdna Foundation
also helped in shaping the paper and offered useful leads 
and input.
— William P. Ryan
April 2001
Contents /vNonprofit Capital: A Review of Problems and Strategies
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 3
1. KEY THEMES 5




3. STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS FOR NONPROFIT CAPITAL PROBLEMS 13
1: Reforming the Nonprofit Capital Market 14
Reducing Transaction and Opportunity Costs
Improving Foundation Leverage
Encouraging More Philanthropy With Better Information for Donors






3: Reforming Nonprofits 20
Become Bankable
Generate Working Capital Internally
Become Self-Sufficient, or Create Social Enterprises
Grow Nonprofits
Convert to For-Profit Status











Executive Summary /1Nonprofit Capital: A Review of Problems and Strategies
THIS PAPER WAS PREPARED TO HELP the Fannie Mae and RockefellerFoundations review the challenges and opportunities nonprofit organiza-tions face in attempting to meet their need for financial capital, particularly
in the areas of community and work-force development. Based on interviews and a
literature review, the paper presents a summary of notable strategies and practices.
Key Themes. Those interviewed for the scan are generally optimistic, in large part
because nonprofits are more inclined and competent than ever to deal with finance
and management issues, but they still find that working capital is the hardest to
raise. Most feel that performance and capital are inseparable, and that simply sup-
plying more capital — without attention to how it is invested — is not enough.
Defining Nonprofit Capital and Its Benefits. Observers make two sets of distinc-
tions in analyzing the capital problem and its solutions:
 Three types of capital meet different needs and have generated different strategies:
➤ facilities capital funds the building or acquisition of offices and facilities;
➤ working capital covers expenses during low cash flow and funds strategic 
investments in an organization’s capacity; and 
➤ permanent capital refers both to endowments and to the capital reserves 
that community development organizations use to invest in housing and 
business development.
 The purported benefits of capital all center on improving productivity — 
especially compelling in today’s environment, where:
➤ expensive information technology is believed to be essential to enhanced 
efficiency;
➤ an emerging organizational effectiveness movement stresses investment of 
working capital in management processes; and
➤ capital can be a competitive asset that might not produce better program 
outcomes but could enable the organization to survive when faced with larger,
better-capitalized competitors.
Strategies and Solutions. The nonprofit capital solutions that were cited most
often in the literature and interviews represent four strategies for dealing with
capital challenges:
 Reforming the Nonprofit Capital Market — Some analysts envision a more
rational, segmented, and therefore more efficient and responsive, nonprofit capital
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Examples of this include: reducing transaction and opportunity costs; improv-
ing foundation leverage; and encouraging more philanthropy with better informa-
tion for donors.
 Reforming Philanthropy — Some argue for making grants function more like
working capital that nonprofits can use to improve their capacity and perform-
ance, and less like revenues that fund direct service provision.
Examples of this strategy include: high-engagement grantmaking (including 
the much discussed idea of venture philanthropy) in which funders add value and
ensure accountability by becoming more involved in grantees’ work; proprietary
intermediaries, which focus on building the capacity of a chosen few nonprofits,
instead of an entire field; stabilization funds, which build capital reserves and finan-
cial management capacity; philanthropic tax credits, which promote larger, longer
term grants, and management assistance, from corporate donors; and program
related investments, which are often credited with sharpening the focus on results.
 Reforming Nonprofits — Others argue that nonprofits can generate their own
working capital by: operating more efficiently; learning to use debt more aggres-
sively; or by earning unrestricted income in the marketplace, although the latter
may be built on widespread but dubious assumptions that public and philanthropic
funds are shrinking.
Examples of nonprofit reform strategies include: making nonprofits bankable;
generating working capital internally, primarily through better pricing of services;
creating self-sufficient nonprofits or social enterprises; growing nonprofits; and
converting to for-profit status.
 Expanding Access to Private Capital — The big prize for a growing field of ana-
lysts, innovators and policymakers is access to the private capital market, a prospect
that has inspired a variety of innovations aimed at supplying permanent capital for
community development projects.
➤ Institutional strategies to access private capital focus on creating the infrastructure
for community investment by funding and strengthening a wide array of community
development financial institutions (CDFIs).
➤ Technical innovations for accessing the private capital markets include the use of
tax-exempt bonds (generally for facilities); net-lease finance (in which nonprofits
convert real estate into capital by selling it and leasing it back); and secondary mar-
kets to replenish the capital supplies of CDFIs.
➤ Public policy uses tax credits to encourage lending to and investment in CDFIs.
➤ Social investment strategies attempt to cultivate socially motivated investors, both
individual and institutional, often willing to accept low returns as a trade-off for
capitalizing social ventures.
This paper was commissioned by the Fannie Mae and RockefellerFoundations to review current practices and thinking on how to meetnonprofit organizations’ need for financial capital. Both foundations,
joined by the Surdna Foundation, wanted a map of this vast, sometimes techni-
cally complex landscape to aid in their own analysis and strategy development.
The paper is based on interviews (with nonprofit managers, consultants,
researchers and bankers) and a review of the literature, highlights of which are
summarized under “Related Reading.” The interviews were open-ended discus-
sions aimed at identifying both new and important practices and the underlying
assumptions that shaped them. The interviewees cited dozens of practices and
strategies in use across the nonprofit sector. But the paper gives special attention
to those that grow out of or may be most relevant to two program areas of special
interest to the foundations: community development and work-force development.
The final result of this exercise is in fact much like a map. The paper attempts
to provide an overview that might help decision makers better understand their
options. So while it does not pretend to be a technical manual that readers can
use, for example, to learn how to issue tax-exempt bonds, it does provide a context
for considering the potential of tax-exempt bonds. It could help in thinking about
some key questions: What kind of capital will a given approach generate? What
can nonprofits accomplish with that capital? What are the alternatives? How else
can we think about the problems of capital?
The paper has four parts. Part one sketches a few cross-cutting key themes 
that emerged from the interviews and literature review. Part two defines nonprofit
capital, and the problems that various types of capital attempt to solve. Part 
three — the bulk of the paper — reviews the strategies and solutions offered in
response to nonprofit capital problems, organized into categories that highlight
the strategies that shape them. Part four is devoted to brief concluding reflections.
Following that is an annotated bibliography of some notable books and articles 
on capital issues.






THE OBSERVERS INTERVIEWED FOR THIS PAPER and reflected in the litera-ture approach nonprofit capital questions from very different angles. Yetthree themes emerged so consistently they are worth noting at the outset:
 Observers are generally optimistic. 
While many were eloquent in describing barriers and frustrations they face,
most observers described important shifts in attitude, practice and opportunity
that they felt were already enabling real progress in meeting nonprofit capital
needs. Observers did almost universally describe a culture marked by nonprofit
ignorance of, and indifference to, finance issues, and to funders who were often
as much part of the problem as the solution. But most suggested that attitudes
and technical competence had improved markedly in recent years, creating yet
more opportunities for progress.
 Working capital presents the biggest challenge. 
As the paper makes clear in many cases, working capital, which enables non-
profits to invest in their own capacity, is critically important and generally diffi-
cult to come by. Even nonprofits that are part of the community development
financial infrastructure — dedicated to providing capital for economic develop-
ment — find that they themselves are in need of working capital.
 Performance and capital are inseparable. 
Nonprofits need capital to perform, yet no one wants to provide capital to a
nonprofit that is not capable of performing. This conundrum has profoundly
shaped many of the responses to capital challenges. It may account for the gen-
eral scarcity of philanthropic working capital, and it surely explains the emer-
gence of several new approaches that stress accountability for performance as a
condition of capital investment. Several observers even argued that providing
too much working capital from external sources could be a problem, not a solu-
tion: nonprofits might “hide behind the capital,” using it to compensate for poor
performance, not for investing in better performance.
Before getting to the strategies that raise these themes, a review of the





THE DISCUSSION IN THIS SECTION defines several types of capital, theirfunctions and their benefits. More than an exercise meant to clarifyterms, it is an important part of the mapping of nonprofit capital devel-
opment because it helps answer several fundamental questions:
What is the nature of the nonprofit sector’s capital problem? 
Is that problem different today — more complex or more urgent — than in previous years?
What do we gain by solving by it, and by trying to solve it now? 
The following types of capital are treated in this discussion:
 Facilities Capital. 
Facilities Capital funds the building or acquisition of real estate to house non-
profit offices and programs. Although observers argue that the process of raising
facilities capital can be an excellent opportunity to address a nonprofit’s long-
range strategic and financial goals, many nonprofit managers mistakenly con-
clude that once they have a facility, it will generate a sustainable flow of revenue
by attracting more program participants.
 Working Capital.
Working Capital is the most sought after and most scarce type of capital for
most nonprofits. It can fund routine expenses during periods of low cash flow or
more strategic investments in an organization’s capacity to grow or improve its
services. Since many funders find it risky to invest in an organization they do not
control, they may make working capital available through more hands-on grant-
making that gives them the opportunity to ensure the capital is used productively.
 Permanent Capital. 
Permanent Capital refers both to funds granted for an organization’s endow-
ment and to the capital reserves that community development organizations 
use to invest in housing and business development. While the capital develop-
ment pools of many community development financial institutions have been
expanded, the permanent capital in these pools is to be passed through as
investments in the community, and does not necessarily supply working capital
to the nonprofit making those investments.
The following discussion of these types of capital will provide a context for
the later review of strategies and solutions aimed at addressing capital problems.
2
Defining Nonprofit Capital and Its Benefits
Facilities Capital
NO ONE CONTESTS THE IDEA that capital made
available for acquisition or improvement of facili-
ties for a nonprofit will produce better-housed
organizations. That is why facilities funds —
most notably for arts and cultural organizations
and, more recently, child-care operators and
human service organizations — have found such
a useful niche. Observers do differ, however,
on the more far-reaching effects of facilities
funding. Can it strengthen an organization’s
broader fiscal and organizational capacities? Or
does it distract weak organizations from develop-
ing those other capacities?
As a platform for building better organizations.
Nonprofits that buy and manage their own facili-
ties are sometimes imagined to get the same 
benefits as households that move from renting 
to homeownership: more security, the ability to
develop equity and more sophistication for manag-
ing all of their financial affairs.
Carl Sussman, a nonprofit consultant and oper-
ator of a child-care facilities fund, argues for these
benefits in a recent paper reviewing the prospects
for nonprofit facilities funds:
Facilities loan funds often stimulate broader sys-
temic changes that affect operating income and
the willingness of providers to assume debt,
leverage new sources of capital and in other ways
stimulate higher levels of capital investments in
community-based child and family support facili-
ties. These are the indirect benefits of a specialized
facilities loan program.1
More capital for facilities, according to this
logic, will produce not only better-housed non-
profits, but better-run nonprofits as well.
As a substitute for building better organiza-
tions. Other analysts argue that making more
facilities capital available — in the absence of
comprehensive financial planning and strategy
development — can do more harm than good.
According to Clara Miller, president of the
Nonprofit Finance Fund, nonprofits often look 
at facilities questions in isolation from business
planning and strategy development. In these
cases, she says, facilities capital can be “an alba-
tross,” encouraging nonprofits to “take on a build-
ing that’s too big without looking at the business
inside. Instead of getting security and equity, they
get debt service and maintenance obligations that
they underestimated.”
The Nonprofit Finance Fund’s recently
launched Building for the Future program helps
nonprofits cope with these sometimes overwhelm-
ing obligations. As the feasibility study for the new
program found, facilities ownership does not nec-
essarily beget good programs or better-managed
organizations. Reviewing the situation of a sample
of Boys and Girls Clubs in the northeast United
States, the Fund discovered that “the best-attended
Clubs generally had the highest number of perma-
nent staff, indicating that dedicated leaders (not
square footage) attract young people…Square
footage attracts neither members nor money.” And
those who regard facility ownership as a potential
cash cow (generating revenue from facility rentals,
for example) tend not to invest in facilities mainte-
nance. Clubs generating the highest percentage of
their revenues from building-driven activities are
the very ones that “spend the least on their build-
ings per square foot.” 2
As with the Boys and Girls Clubs, so with arts
and cultural groups, and even with community
development corporations (CDCs): it can be easier
to acquire or develop facilities than it can be to
manage them effectively over time.
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Working Capital
WORKING CAPITAL ENABLES AN ORGANIZATION to
make strategic investments in its own capacity: to
develop new programs; conduct research; evaluate 
its work; engage in planning and analysis; upgrade
technology; support staff or board development;
and expand the organization. Not surprisingly, it
emerges as the most important type of capital
from this scan: it is the most sought after by non-
profits; it is potentially the most productive type 
of capital, with a number of claims made for it;
and by most accounts, it is the hardest to obtain.
Working capital can come in the form of either
equity (sometimes seen as grants in the nonprofit
context) or debt.
Though this paper does not explore it at length,
working capital has a second important meaning.
In contrast to the more strategic investments men-
tioned above, working capital can also serve as a
ready supply of cash to cover the organization’s rou-
tine expenses during periods of low cash flow (e.g.,
before expected payments are made on grants or
government contracts). Though no less vital and
often more pressing than the strategic working cap-
ital, this type of cash-flow funding may be more
readily available to nonprofits. For example, non-
profits can establish lines of credit with commercial
banks, or take “bridge loans” from loan funds spe-
cializing in nonprofit organizations.
It is the idea of working capital as a source 
of strategic organizational investment that seems
especially salient today, in large part because of a
number of (sometimes-implicit) claims about the
potential benefits of working capital. The discus-
sion below reviews these claims and their underly-
ing assumptions.
The generic working capital claim: productivity.
In competent hands, working capital makes an
organization more productive. Susan Kenny
Stevens, a nonprofit financial consultant and man-
ager of over a dozen nonprofit loan funds, observes
that “nonprofits with working capital have more
choices, more staying power and are more likely 
to strengthen organizational capacity.” 3 Economists
make the same argument slightly differently:
because of “ ‘diminishing returns to production,’ at
some point, without the addition of further units
of capital, adding one more unit of labor leads to a
negative increase in a firm’s output. At that point,
a firm cannot produce additional units of goods 
or services without additional infusions of capital.
Thus, access to capital is strongly related to growth
in the productivity of labor.” 4
Without the benefit of economic theory, non-
profit advocates and observers are advancing a
series of more specific claims about the need for
and benefits of working capital, some made more
compelling by recent developments in the non-
profit environment.
Better organizations. Working capital could help
nonprofits become more efficient and more effec-
tive. And as efficiency and effectiveness have
become ascendant concepts in the nonprofit sector,
so has the idea of working capital as a resource to
support them.
Efficiency is increasingly framed as a matter of
technology, which quickly leads to questions of capi-
tal: nonprofits feel they need better technology, and
capital investments to purchase it. The work-force
development managers interviewed as part of a
seven-city survey for the Rockefeller Foundation in
1998 consistently cited lack of information technol-
ogy as a barrier to efficiency. They felt it hindered
administration, case management and, ultimately,
program evaluation and improvement (because it left
them with weak databases that were hard to work
with).5 The growth of information technology —
and the fear that nonprofits are lagging behind for-
profits and government in their technological capac-
ity — is surely driving a good a deal of the recent
attention to working capital.
A more comprehensive analysis, also growing in
popularity, argues that investment in organizational
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processes will improve the overall effectiveness of a
nonprofit, helping it deliver better-quality services
and more efficacious programs. Systems for learn-
ing, innovating and improving services, for exam-
ple, can all contribute to effectiveness, and all
require working capital to design and implement.
Like information technology, interest in organiza-
tional effectiveness may be at an unprecedented
high point in the nonprofit sector. 6
We can explain why these arguments are
salient, but are they compelling? There is, after all,
no guarantee that supplying nonprofits with work-
ing capital will lead to more efficiency or effective-
ness, which may explain why foundations still tend
to favor program-specific grants over general oper-
ating support. It may also explain why foundations
that do make more working capital available may
also want better oversight and input into nonprofit
affairs, an important phenomenon discussed later.
Bigger organizations. Proponents of working capi-
tal almost always point out how important it is to
organizational growth7, and their logic is unassail-
able. Growth means more staff, more facilities or
equipment and more systems to manage all of these
— often in advance of any revenue from government
contracts or philanthropic donations. As in business,
where capital is generally raised to grow an organi-
zation, so with nonprofits: no capital, no growth.
But how many nonprofits really want to grow?
And how many foundations are interested in sup-
porting that growth? At best, many nonprofits
might be considered ambivalent about growth.
Their devotion to a local mission and to personal
one-on-one contact with their clients leaves many
nonprofit employees indifferent to growth. CDCs
and work-force development organizations, for
example, often see their mission in place-based
terms. They may want to increase their volume
through more contracts or development projects,
but they are not likely to want to pursue multi-site
expansion. And foundations, often more interested
in the general public good than in the fortunes of
any one organization, have the option of investing
in replication or diffusion strategies instead of in
organizational growth.
So organizational growth may be both an
irrefutable rationale for increasing the supply of
working capital — and an irrelevant one.
More competitive organizations. Working capital
can also be a competitive asset, particularly in 
markets where for-profits are active.8 The research 
literature does not seem to suggest that better- 
capitalized organizations produce more value for
clients or communities. Comparative studies of 
day-care, home-health and other programs suggest
that the outcomes of nonprofits and for-profits
(which often enjoy better access to capital) are quite
similar. 9 But even if program outcomes are the
same, better-capitalized organizations may have a
distinct competitive advantage over thinly capitalized
ones. So where and when is lack of capital a signifi-
cant competitive disadvantage for nonprofits? Two
types of markets would seem to pose special chal-
lenges: scale-sensitive and risk-sharing markets.
Scale-sensitive markets. In some cost-competi-
tive markets, the only way for organizations to
realize a profit or surplus is through growth, which
reduces their overhead as a share of total operating
expenses. As the founder of a for-profit after-
school program said of the economics of her pro-
gram, “It doesn’t work for one school. It doesn’t
even work for five schools, and it just begins to
start making sense for 100 schools.” 10 Once larger
organizations gain such efficiencies of scale, they
can begin offering yet more competitive prices.
The result, for smaller organizations, is competi-
tive disadvantage. One way to cope is to grow,
which in turn would require expansion capital.
Risk-sharing markets. Some competitive markets
are shaped by risk-sharing contracts. For example,
under competitive performance-based contracts,
providers contracting with a government agency
Working Capital /10
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forego some or even most of their fee if they cannot
deliver the result specified in the contract. Only
organizations with a capital base — and one they
are willing to put at risk — can be competitive in
these markets. Even if the provider delivers the
result, it may still need a reserve to cover expenses
until it passes the final milestone and triggers the
full payment. It is important to note, however, that
few nonprofits (or for-profits) are subject to pure
performance contracts. As an earlier scan suggested,
work-force development organizations often found
ways — short of accessing new capital — to miti-
gate the effects of these contracts, which were
sometimes not as austere as advertised.11
Permanent Capital
PERMANENT CAPITAL NORMALLY REFERS to
endowments or reserves that are not meant to be
liquidated until the organization goes out of busi-
ness, although they might be drawn upon occa-
sionally for special needs and opportunities, and
the income they generate is often used as working
capital.12 For the purposes of this paper, permanent
capital will also be used to refer to the capital
pools of CDFIs, the organizations that provide
credit and equity for community economic devel-
opment projects (including housing, commercial
real estate and business development).
How to categorize these capital pools for com-
munity development is a thorny problem, and it
points to a special challenge facing the nonprofit
community development field. On the one hand,
as will be clear by the end of this report, the chal-
lenge of capitalizing CDFIs has been met with
impressive ingenuity and innovation: most of the
technical solutions reviewed later are aimed at cap-
italizing these loan pools. On the other hand, capi-
talizing CDFIs does not, in the end, speak to the
capital challenges of nonprofit organizations them-
selves. The end-users of CDFI funds are often
businesses — not nonprofit organizations. And it
is the end-users, not nonprofit financial institu-
tions that are accessing new supplies of working
capital to expand their operations. The CDFIs —
though a critical conduit for this capital flow —
end up facing many of the same cash-flow and
strategic working capital challenges as any other
nonprofit.
So these community development capital pools
are not like permanent capital in the strict sense:
they are not for the benefit of the organization
itself. But it would be wrong to treat them as
working capital, since they do not function as such
for the nonprofit organizations that hold them.
● ● ●
Even this fairly simple classification of different forms
of nonprofit capital and their purposes can help get us
from thinking about a monolithic capital problem to a
more refined assessment of the various capital needs of
a given nonprofit, or group of nonprofits. Facilities,
working and permanent capital satisfy different needs.
The strategies reviewed in the next section collectively
address all these capital challenges, but individually
they tend to focus on only one of them. Making these
distinctions is critical to understanding how to respond
to any or all of the nonprofit capital challenges.
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THIS SECTION SUMMARIZES THE NONPROFIT CAPITAL SOLUTIONS thatwere cited most often in the literature and interviews. The solutions areorganized into four strategies. This approach emphasizes how various
innovators conceive of the nonprofit capital challenge, organizing them around
four underlying theories of change:
 Reforming the Nonprofit Capital Market.
Some analysts envision a more rational, segmented and therefore more efficient
and responsive nonprofit capital market, emphasizing not so much the amount
of capital available but the terms and consequences of that capital.
 Reforming Philanthropy.
Many have focused on optimizing the impact of philanthropic dollars by mak-
ing grants and gifts function more like working capital that nonprofits can use
to improve their capacity and performance, and less like revenues that fund
direct service provision.
 Reforming Nonprofits.
Others argue that the nonprofits can generate their own working capital by oper-
ating more efficiently or by earning unrestricted income in the marketplace.
 Expanding Access to Private Capital.
The big prize for a growing field of analysts, innovators and policymakers is
direct access to the private capital market, which has led to a variety of innova-
tions, most of which generate capital for community development projects
(though not always the nonprofits that manage them).
A few innovations seemed to defy easy categorization, and one could argue
about where to assign them, but it seems more useful to propose a compre-
hensive view of all the innovations, even with a few wrinkles, than to offer a
mere catalogue.
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Strategies and Solutions for Nonprofit Capital Problems
Strategy #1 
Reforming the Nonprofit 
Capital Market
SOME ANALYSTS AND ADVOCATES PROPOSE a bet-
ter organized nonprofit capital market as a lever
for improving nonprofit performance; enhancing
foundation leverage strategies; and expanding the
supply of philanthropic capital available to non-
profits. They argue that the way that capital is
organized and deployed is nearly as important as
the absolute amount of money available.
Reducing Transaction and 
Opportunity Costs
This market-reforming analysis sees an indirect
but powerful link between the nonprofit capital
market and nonprofit performance. The current
nonprofit capital market is disorganized and 
not clearly segmented, which imposes high trans-
action and opportunity costs on managers, who 
are forced to spend huge amounts of time fund-
raising. And, argues Jed Emerson of the Harvard
Business School, the funding they do get is 
often packaged and conditioned — in small
amounts, with many restrictions, and without
regard to the developmental stage of the non-
profit — in unhelpful ways.13 “The disorderliness
and complexity of the philanthropic funding 
environment,” according to Allen Grossman of 
the Harvard Business School, “distracts nonprofit
management, shifting focus away from organiza-
tional performance.” 14
As significant as these transaction and oppor-
tunity costs are, Emerson emphasizes that a bet-
ter organized capital market is not in itself any
guarantee of performance. It is a market that sup-
plies the appropriate forms of capital, “together
with the presence of talented management and
staff along with a little luck in the form of market
timing, which makes for success or failure in the
nonprofit world.” 15
Improving Foundation Leverage 
This disorganized capital market affects founda-
tions as well as nonprofits. As Emerson suggests 
in a discussion about the respective roles of govern-
ment and philanthropy in funding nonprofits,
the potential for leverage is greater in clearly seg-
mented markets. If foundations are working on the
assumption that their grants will leverage govern-
ment spending, while at the same time government
funders are hoping to attract private philanthropic
capital, can either have an effective leverage strat-
egy? Even within philanthropy itself, if all funders
prefer to fund early stage work in the hopes of
attracting other donors, who will be left to take up
the challenge? In response, the market-reforming
strategy calls for more segmentation, with funders
making explicit their willingness to fund nonprofits
at various stages of their development.
Encouraging More Philanthropy 
With Better Information for Donors
Efficient markets are characterized by good infor-
mation, which enables both customers and firms
to make informed choices. Building on this
insight, the market-organizing proponents advo-
cate better information, particularly better infor-
mation for donors, which could raise their
confidence and therefore their willingness to
donate more money to nonprofits.
At the conceptual level, several proponents of
market organizing are working on the development
of standard metrics for assessing “Social Return on
Investment;” Jed Emerson’s work toward develop-
ing SROIs is both comprehensive and grounded.
His model, developed with colleagues at the
Roberts Enterprise Development Fund (REDF),
tries to capture three distinct types of value created
by nonprofits: the “economic” value of their serv-
ices; the “social” value of the improvements to
clients’ lives; and the “socio-economic” value
enjoyed by society when nonprofits relieve it of
more expensive, remedial government services.16
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REDF has run a two-year pilot effort to use
SROIs to assess the value created by its grantees.
The CDFI Data Project 17 is creating a CDFI
data collection and management system that has
the potential to transform the way information is
collected and used in the development finance
field. Data on CDFIs is now collected by a variety
of funders, trade associations and researchers, each
interested in different characteristics and segments
of the CDFI field. This comprehensive system
will minimize reporting requirements on CDFIs;
it will also improve the quality of CDFI data and
enable practitioners to compare their organiza-
tions and programs to a broad group of peers.
The project will make an important contribution
through the standardized data set it produces.
Eventually, this data will include standard out-
come metrics for the field. Considering the diffi-
culty of measuring social returns on investment
and other outcome metrics, these indicators will
emerge after the first year, after ample consulta-
tion with CDFI practitioners.
Others are working not on better metrics, but
on more accessible information for donors, often by
using the Internet. SEA Change, a new association
advocating for the interests of social entrepreneurs,
is considering launching a variant of Garage.com,
which is a Web site where entrepreneurs can seek
venture capital backing, and other resources, for
their business ideas. In this variant, Garage.org,
social entrepreneurs and philanthropists would seek
each other out.
In the San Francisco Bay Area, Craigslist
Nonprofit Venture Forums provide an opportunity
for start-up nonprofits to pitch their concepts and
strategies to potential donors in a fast-moving
process aimed at cutting down the pain of philan-
thropic matchmaking. The sponsor, Craigslist.org,
sees the forums as an extension of their extremely
popular Web site, which helps Bay Area residents
connect with one other through postings about jobs,
events, housing and volunteer opportunities. The
venture forum was founded by Jane Leu, founder of
Upwardly Global, a nonprofit work-force develop-
ment organization for new immigrants, after a series
of frustrating and time-consuming experiences try-
ing to present her idea to established foundations.
● ● ●
The market-reform strategies envision an environ-
ment more responsive to the needs of nonprofits at
various stages of their development. The capital strate-
gies that follow propose new roles and tools for the
various actors within that market.
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Strategy #2
Reforming Philanthropy
IT’S PROBABLY NOT AN EXAGGERATION to say 
that a new consensus is emerging that philan-
thropy could be the most important source of
working capital for nonprofits — if foundation
practices were reformed so that restrictive grant
funds could function more like capital.
The initiatives reviewed below are all premised
on this assumption, one shared by many of the
observers interviewed for this paper. The manager
of a stabilization fund complained that too many
foundations are “promoting grant-seeking behav-
ior” that does not improve the ability of the organ-
izations to perform or grow. A nonprofit finance
consultant said the problem with most grants is
that they are “controlling, not enabling.” These, of
course, are the sentiments traditionally voiced by
nonprofit advocates seeking more general operat-
ing grants.
The emerging consensus, however, argues for
more than unrestricted funds: As much as non-
profits need working capital, it is not always wise
for foundations to deliver it — unless they can do
so in a way that ensures nonprofits will use it to
improve productivity and outcomes. Short of such
measures, general operating support can become,
in the words of Susan Kenny Stevens, “a budget-
balancing wild card doled out by foundations as a
philanthropic allowance.” 18 Instead of providing
the stimulus and resources for nonprofits to make
strategic investments in their own capacity, she
argues, unrestricted funding can encourage a
“dependence mentality” in which desperate non-
profits greet each new grant with enormous relief
— and then treat them as cash, not capital for
organizational improvements.
High-Engagement Grantmaking
In high-engagement grantmaking, foundation staff
work closely with their grantees, both to help
them achieve their organizational improvement
goals and to satisfy themselves that their funds are
being well used.
The most visible form of high-engagement
grantmaking is a style inspired by or modeled after
venture capital. Since at least the 1970s, philan-
thropists have compared their role to that of ven-
ture capitalists, pointing out that both focus on the
development of new ideas for broader application.
By the early 1990s, a new set of practitioners and
analysts began appropriating the metaphor to
emphasize a different point — that venture capital
(and grantmaking styled after it) is important for
its ability to strengthen an organization’s capacity
to perform. This distinction between support for
an innovation (in conventional grants) and support
for an organization is emphasized in the pioneer-
ing work of the Roberts Economic Development
Fund and the Peninsula Community Foundation’s
Center for Venture Philanthropy (both in the San
Francisco Bay Area), and was explicated in a 1997
analysis that ran in the Harvard Business Review.19
Much of that analysis is now often obscured
by “venture philanthropy” — a catchall phrase
sometimes used to suggest strategic investment in
organizational capacity, but often used much more
generally to denote a results-oriented style or
ambience favored by many newly wealthy donors.
Meanwhile, a number of less visible founda-
tions have been pursuing high-engagement philan-
thropy without reference to venture capital or
venture philanthropy. Preliminary analysis of
research conducted on six such models by the
Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations
suggests that grantees benefit in two ways. First,
the grants from high-engagement funders tend to
run longer than average, and are therefore a reli-
able source of working capital for the nonprofits.
Second, the grantees benefit as much, or more,
from general assistance with overall strategy as
they do from any technical management assistance
the funders might offer or pay for. The net result 
is larger blocks of capital with a relationship that
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aims to ensure that it is used as a strategic invest-
ment in the nonprofit’s organizational capacity.20
Proprietary Intermediaries
If we normally think of an intermediary as an
organization that raises money for and works to
build the capacity of a field of nonprofit organiza-
tions, we could think of a proprietary intermedi-
ary as one that takes a narrower focus in funding
and improving a select handful of nonprofits 
in a given field. The tactics of a proprietary 
intermediary would be very similar to those of 
high-engagement funders and venture-capital
philanthropists, although the intermediary is not
incorporated as a foundation.
New American Schools (NAS) provides an excel-
lent example. Started in 1991 with grants from
foundations and corporations for the purpose of
promoting education reform, NAS had awarded
over $150 million in grants, mostly to help seven
education reform organizations achieve large-
scale implementation of their programs, before
redesigning its strategy. NAS concluded that it
could never raise enough money in grants to fund
large-scale implementation. It decided instead to
help the nonprofit school-reform organizations sell
their services to school districts, which were bene-
fiting from increased federal and state funding for
school reform.
NAS then began envisioning its role as that of
an investor, providing working capital and other
forms of assistance that would help the nonprofits
market their reform ideas to school districts. NAS
literally took a proprietary stake in the organiza-
tions by claiming ownership of their intellectual
property — the school reform program designs.
Although it continues to offer working capital
grants, it now plans to offer debt that the nonprof-
its will repay when their larger-scale businesses
generate enough income. Prudential Insurance has
made a 10-year loan of $10 million to NAS,
bringing its capital base to $15.7 million; it 
eventually wants a capital base of $25 million.
Although the Local Initiatives Support
Corporation (LISC) is a premier field-building
intermediary, advocating for and working with
CDCs across the country, it has helped launch a
series of funding programs that provide CDCs
with working capital and technical assistance,
more in the style of a proprietary intermediary. In 
a typical LISC Operating Support Collaborative,
a group of funders capitalizes a special fund and
hires staff to manage it. The fund targets a small
number of CDCs in one city and provides rela-
tively large blocks of capital (as general operating
support grants) over as much as five years. The
grants support specific organization-building
objectives that have been formulated by the par-
ticipating CDCs and endorsed by the funders.
The funders, through their staff, then work closely
with the CDCs to monitor and improve their
progress toward the designated goal.
Stabilization Funds
Pioneered by funders of the arts over 20 years ago,
stabilization funds provide nonprofits with endow-
ment or cash-reserve capital as part of a larger effort
to improve their financial situations. The capital
provided is generally not meant as working capital
for immediate needs, but as a base that will generate
income over the long-term and, in some cases, be
available as a reserve fund for special projects.21
The logic of the original funds for arts organi-
zations is straightforward: if these nonprofits had
the capital and knowledge needed for better mar-
keting, financial management and general admin-
istration, they could improve their chances of
generating more revenue from ticket sales and
become more stable. Although they might not be
expected to become totally self-sufficient, founda-
tion grants would not be what Stevens calls the
“wild card” in balancing perennially mismanaged
budgets. Instead, they would provide resources for
organizational improvement.
The management assistance components of the
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stabilization funds can be significant. National
Arts Stabilization, the flagship of the funds, condi-
tions release of funding on achievement of desig-
nated milestones. It offers assistance with financial
planning, management and board development, all
aimed at strengthening the arts organization. It
has recently embarked on what may be one of the
few attempts to evaluate the outcomes of manage-
ment assistance to nonprofits.
The Ford Foundation, which has long been a
promoter of stabilization funds, made a series of
large grants in June 2000 that are also aimed at
improving the capacity and financial stability of
arts groups. Called “New Directions/New
Donors,” the Ford initiative granted $40 million to
28 organizations, with grants ranging in size from
$1.25 to $2.5 million. The grants carry a matching
requirement, and are intended to help arts organi-
zations find a new donor base among the newly
wealthy. The Nonprofit Finance Fund will docu-
ment the process and its outcomes.
The Rockefeller Foundation has extended the
stabilization concept beyond the arts in a 15-year
program “to encourage independence and improve
the financial stability of four major civil rights liti-
gation organizations.” Begun in 1985, the program
offered major grants that were to be used as quasi-
endowments (i.e., mostly for generating income
over the long-term, but also available as cash
reserves for special needs or opportunities). This
Basic Rights Stabilization Program was ambitious
in its time commitments and grant sizes, granting
the four nonprofits a total of $15 million in capital
in three five-year cycles, but was not designed to
provide management assistance.
Philanthropic Tax Credits 
State tax credits for corporate philanthropy are
emerging as an appealing means for converting
philanthropic grants into significant sources of
working capital for nonprofits. Commonly known
as “neighborhood assistance programs” (NAPs),
they are available in 16 states; four other states are
considering instituting the programs. The annual
value of the credits varies from $2 million to 
$15 million per state.
NAPs offer state tax credits to corporations
that agree to make commitments for large grants,
over a long period of time, to selected nonprofits.
Most require corporations to work with the non-
profits on strategy development or organizational
capacity building, sometimes mandating plans that
outline the major objectives and milestones of the
nonprofits. In most cases, eligible nonprofits must
be community-based organizations working to
improve low-income areas, the goal being to move
capital and expertise from downtown to struggling
neighborhoods.
Pennsylvania was the first state to launch a
NAP and is considered to have the most ambitious
and innovative program. Enacted in 1967, and
expanded in 1994, the Neighborhood Assistance/
Comprehensive Service Program offers $15 mil-
lion in credits. A participating corporation receives
a 70 percent state tax credit on donations made to
a maximum of two nonprofit “partners.” The cor-
poration must agree to make grants of $250,000
per year, per nonprofit for a 10-year period. The
grants are to advance the goals specified in a
Comprehensive Service Plan developed by the
nonprofits and submitted to the state. Participating
nonprofits must be engaged in “comprehensive
service programs” aimed at meeting both the physi-
cal and social needs of the neighborhood.22 
Program Related Investments
PRIs may be most notable in a discussion of non-
profit capital for their untapped potential.
Authorized in the tax reform act of 1969, PRIs
allow foundations to “invest” in nonprofits by mak-
ing below-market loans, provided that financial gain
is not the primary motive of the foundation and
that the funds are not used for political lobbying.
Although the data on PRI use is thin, it does
support the widely voiced sentiment that PRIs are
not widely used. The Foundation Center’s most
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comprehensive analysis tracks the use of PRIs from
1993 to 1995. At that point, Ford and MacArthur
accounted for approximately one third and 10 per-
cent of total PRI activity, respectively. Nonprofits
working in housing and community development
attracted 63 percent of PRI dollars. Almost half of
all PRIs were made to intermediaries.23 Although
most were probably CDFIs, this review has noted
the use of PRIs in intermediaries brokering tax-
exempt bonds, a school-reform intermediary and
long-standing intermediaries like LISC.
Several observers concluded that PRIs are too
demanding for foundations and nonprofits.
Program officers (many carrying large grant port-
folios) would have to invest considerable time in
due diligence, deal structuring and negotiation to
execute PRIs. And nonprofits, many averse to any
kind of debt finance, may find the process too
demanding as well. In opting out, according to
some observers, they forego an excellent opportu-
nity to assess nonprofits in a more “holistic way”
and to address underlying capacity problems that
might make it difficult to repay the PRI.24 The
demands of PRIs may explain why so many are
delivered through specialized intermediaries,
which presumably have developed the technical
competence to execute PRIs.
● ● ●
The philanthropic reform strategies hold real promise
for meeting the capital needs of nonprofits. Though it’s
true that foundation grants comprise a relatively small
share of nonprofit income, foundations have the free-
dom, motivation and, increasingly, the knowledge to
make their grants function more like working capital.
We turn next to the work nonprofits can do to meet
their own capital challenges.
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Strategy #3
Reforming Nonprofits
WHILE MANY STRATEGIES ATTEMPT to change 
the environment within which nonprofits work —
by organizing a more efficient market, reforming
philanthropy or making private capital markets
accessible — others see nonprofits themselves as 
a major part of the solution to their own capital
problem. Various analysts have proposed five ways
nonprofits can ease their own capital challenges:
➤ Become bankable — so they can access the huge
banking finance system.
➤ Generate working capital internally — by pricing
services correctly and aiming to accumulate 
surpluses.
➤ Create/become self-sufficient nonprofits — by mak-
ing them “social enterprises” that are not depend-
ent on subsidies but earn unrestricted revenue in
the market.
➤ Grow nonprofits — since many of the barriers to
capital can actually be understood as the problems
of small-scale organizations.
➤ Convert nonprofits to for-profit status — since
investment equity is only available to for-profits.
Proponents of most of these tactics emphasize that
nonprofits will need to change their own culture,
which often does not value capital, financial man-
agement or organizational capacity. As Susan
Kenny Stevens points out, “Too many nonprofits
believe that producing even a modest year-end
surplus is either against the rules or will render
them unfundable.” 25 Another says the biggest bar-
rier for CDFIs — ironically, since they themselves
are purveyors of capital to businesses — is their
“ideological opposition to business thinking” when
it comes to making their own operations more
efficient and sustainable.
These attitudes — as the review of practices
below will affirm — are giving way, where they have
not entirely vanished, to a much greater willingness
to accumulate equity, use debt finance and approach
financial management more as a strategy, and not
just administrative competence. As Tim Freundlich
of the Calvert Foundation says, “There’s a growing
maturation of capital structures in the nonprofit
sector. People understand you can have debt.”
Become Bankable
Some observers emphasized that with some more
technical competence and management assistance,
most nonprofits can become bankable and access
mainstream financial services. A long-familiar
analysis suggests that the gap between nonprofits
(especially smaller ones) and banks is enormous.
But that view seems to be giving way in the face of
a new reality.
The traditional observation about banks is that
they have not regarded nonprofits as profitable
customers, and have therefore been largely indif-
ferent and inaccessible to them. Tuckman provides
a good roundup of explanations for this view in his
overview of nonprofit finance. Most banks, he rea-
sons, do not understand nonprofit finances, and,
because of their ignorance, “see these entities as
risky investments.” Even if they see a viable mar-
ket, banks might “fear adverse publicity that
accompanies foreclosure on nonprofit property.”
Those willing to foreclose on nonprofit property
might end up with assets too specialized (e.g., a
botanical garden or rural hospital) to resell.26
The longstanding view of nonprofits suggests
that even willing bankers would not have found
much of a nonprofit market. Nonprofits have long
been viewed as simply not interested in, or edu-
cated about, bank financing. They see themselves,
according to one loan-fund manager, as “grant-
dependent nonprofits, not social enterprises.”
Several observers challenged these conventional
views. They see banks actively courting nonprofits,
and nonprofits increasingly aware of their banking
options. Fleet Bank has invested heavily in non-
profit business development — with advertising, a
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dedicated sales force and cultivation techniques
like sponsorship of conferences on topics 
of interest to prospective nonprofit customers.
Citigroup has begun a systematic effort to market
its vast array of financial services to nonprofits, and
develop new products as well. Scores of other
banks, most on a smaller scale, are following suit.
As a result, a few observers now emphasize a
new challenge for nonprofits. Instead of needing
an education about the availability of banking
services, they now need an education to help them
select bank products that will be appropriate to
them. “Bank products,” cautioned one, “are
designed for bank profitability” — not for non-
profit needs. As an arts stabilization fund manager
put it: “When we needed banks, we weren’t bank-
able. When we didn’t need them, we were.”
Generate Working Capital Internally
A number of observers argued that nonprofits
could and should generate their own working capi-
tal by steadily accumulating surpluses to cope with
cash-flow problems and, more ambitiously, fund
the development of new programs or organiza-
tional improvements.
As Tuckman argues, internally generated capi-
tal has some important advantages for nonprofits:
funds are available when needed, the organization
does not have to disclose information to outsiders
and accountability is managed through normal
board oversight 27 (as opposed, for example, to
some of the intensive relationships with high-
engagement funders).
Several observers who emphasized the need for
internally generated capital stressed that it is not
only desirable but essential. If a nonprofit is unable
to generate internal working capital, then capital
provided by foundations will be very risky. Capital
in the hands of an organization that cannot man-
age to generate a surplus may not be an invest-
ment in improved capacity or productivity at all,
but rather a bailout for incompetence.
A banker specializing in nonprofit markets (also
a nonprofit board member), argued that “it doesn’t
make sense to get nonprofits worried about access
to capital when they haven’t taken care of the basics
of running the operations well.” He sees a different
progression, in which nonprofits work their way
through a series of milestones, asking:
Do I have enough to get started? Do I have
enough to make payroll? How fast am I getting
paid from public agencies? Can I speed it up?
How far can I push people in paying what I owe?
Am I getting the most out of my board [in 
donations]? Then, when the operation is running
tightly and it’s time to think about growing it,
you’re ready to start looking for working capital
[from external sources].
A CDFI advocate actually argued that too much
external working capital would distract CDFIs
from focusing on changing their pricing to gener-
ate self-sustaining revenues. To avoid the possi-
bility that nonprofits would “hide behind capital”
— e.g., use it to compensate for poor manage-
ment, not for improving management — he
urged outsiders supplying capital to structure it
around milestones, releasing it in a series of
installments when agreed-upon organizational
goals had been achieved.
The expectation that most nonprofits could
generate equity by preserving surpluses may seem
misplaced. Yet research suggests that the vast
majority of nonprofits, including smaller ones, are
in fact able to generate their own working capital.
Some do so by taking income from endowments,
but “funds accumulated out of cash flow are almost
certainly a major source of capital funds.” 28
Tuckman and Cyril F. Chang (see Related
Readings) studied the IRS filings of over 4,500
charitable nonprofits for 1983 and found that
more than 86 percent of them reported a surplus
of revenues over expenditures. A 1986 study of a
larger sample confirmed the finding. And when
the researchers weighted the data to account for
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the fact that the smallest nonprofits (with under
$25,000 in revenues) were not represented
(because they aren’t required to file tax state-
ments), they found 75 percent of nonprofits were
generating surpluses they could use as equity.29 
How do these findings square with the general
assertion that nonprofits lack capital? One possibil-
ity is that nonprofits, many of whom exhibit a
scarcity mentality, may be developing scarcity
budgets that are easy to meet. They are budgeting
not against what they aspire to accomplish, but
against what they think is available. Having set the
bar low, they then pass it. Nonetheless, the findings
do suggest that the habit of aiming for surpluses
has already been cultivated, and that what remains
is to expand the scale of this practice.
In the interviews, several observers argued
that cost accounting was the major challenge for
nonprofits seeking to generate significant supplies
of working capital internally. According to Gary
Mulhair of Community Wealth Ventures, non-
profits should be “externalizing their costs” by
charging government funders the true cost of
services and “internalizing their cash” by saving
surpluses. The same applies for nonprofits that
charge fees, such as CDCs with development
fees, and CDFIs with loan fees. “The savvier and
less ideologically constrained” CDFIs, for exam-
ple, “recognize you can charge loan fees and they
don’t break deals.” But to charge the true cost of
services or appropriate fees requires some compe-
tence in cost accounting, still a challenge for
many nonprofits.
Become Self-Sufficient, or Create
Social Enterprises
Far more ambitious than a strategy of generating
surpluses as working capital is the emergence of a
new paradigm, in which nonprofits are considered
capable of becoming virtually self-sufficient by
selling services or products in the marketplace.30
Although hardly a new concept,31 it is more preva-
lent and influential than ever.
Roots of the self-sufficiency paradigm:
Funding scarcity. Not surprisingly, the idea of a
nonprofit that earns its revenue in the marketplace
is almost always linked to funding questions — of
where nonprofits will get revenue and how they
will access capital. Observers and proponents cite 
a scarcity of public and philanthropic funds as the
underlying rationale for converting nonprofits
from heavily subsidized charitable institutions into
self-sufficient social enterprises.32
Although they do not link their analysis to
social enterprise, Alan J. Abramson, Lester M.
Salamon and C. Eugene Steuerle do make the
most elaborate case supporting the popular view
that nonprofits face debilitating scarcity. Reviewing
two decades of federal spending, they conclude
that “budget shifts generally increased the pres-
sures on nonprofit organizations to expand their
services, while reducing the resources they had
available to do so, at least outside the health
field.” 33 Federal spending on community develop-
ment, for example, was one percent lower in 1997
than it was in the study’s benchmark year of 1980.
While spending on social services was up 22 per-
cent over 1980 levels, the analysts argue that if
federal outlays had remained steady in the inter-
vening years, an additional $35.1 billion would
have been spent between 1980 and 1997.34
But the picture is more complicated — and
almost certainly not as dire as the analysts sug-
gest. As Steven Rathgeb Smith argues, state and
local governments have often stepped in to com-
pensate for the loss of federal funds. More non-
profits, moreover, have been able to fund a wider
range of services out of Medicaid — one of the
few areas enjoying real growth in spending.
Finally, the federal cutback analysis failed to (or
could not on account of timing) recognize some
important sources of funding — including both
long-standing tax expenditures like the Low
Income Housing Tax Credit and new funding for
welfare-to-work services. Federal spending may 
be preferable to state or local spending, and direct
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funding may be more efficient than tax credits,
but it doesn’t follow that nonprofits lose revenue
as a result of these policies.35
Social enterprise proponents also point to the
ever-increasing competition for philanthropic dol-
lars.36 Yet philanthropy is growing briskly, at this
point probably faster than nonprofit expenditures.
According to The Foundation Center, “Overall,
foundation giving has grown more than two and
one-half times since 1990.” Foundations made
grants worth $22.8 billion in 1999, up from
$19.46 billion in 1998. Even the pessimistic analy-
sis of Federal funding concludes that “the real
growth in private giving…was 3.7 times the rev-
enue losses experienced by nonprofits.” 37
Although the idea that nonprofits must
become self-sufficient because government and
philanthropic funds are shrinking may be flawed,
this does not necessarily make the argument for
social enterprise less attractive. A more compelling
rationale may be based on self-sufficiency as a
value in its own right.
Roots of the self-sufficiency paradigm:
Affirmation of Values. For many proponents,
social enterprise is not merely a strategy for
responding to scarcity, but more fundamentally an
affirmation of values. According to J. Gregory
Dees, a leading academic observer of social enter-
prise, many nonprofit leaders “now consider exten-
sive dependency on donors as a sign of weakness
and vulnerability.” 38
Indeed, nonprofits are operating in a society
that has never valued or promoted entrepreneurism
more, or more widely, than ours does today.
Several think tanks and nonprofit consulting firms
are dedicated to promoting entrepreneurism in
general, or social enterprise more particularly. The
Kauffman Center for Entrepreneurial Leadership
funds and documents dozens of entrepreneurism
efforts — aimed at Boy Scouts, community-
college students, 8- to 12-year-olds, elementary
school students of all ages, teams of mothers and
daughters, business-school students, unemployed
people and, of course, nonprofits.
Several initiatives promote social enterprise by
nonprofits more specifically. Community Wealth
Ventures, a subsidiary of Share Our Strength, is 
a for-profit that helps nonprofits develop “earned
income activities.” The National Center for
Social Entrepreneurs offers both consulting and
training. The Denali Initiative promotes social
enterprise as a means of improving neighborhood
quality of life. Most recently, SEA Change
emerged as an association for social entrepreneurs
and their proponents. While it may be doubtful
that nonprofits need to attain self-sufficiency, it’s
clear that many want to.
Social enterprise and capital. Social enterprises
aimed at self-sufficiency solve one type of capital
problem, but generate another. A nonprofit that
succeeds in offering a service in the market can
gain the enormous benefit of unrestricted income,
the surplus of which becomes working capital. But
in order to develop the capacity and scale to reach
that point of self-sufficiency, social enterprises, like
any enterprise, normally require upfront or work-
ing capital.
An assessment of social-purpose businesses
funded in six cities as part of the Venture Fund
Initiative suggests that social-purpose businesses
often face the same kind of capital crunches as tra-
ditional nonprofits. The Initiative was launched to
assess the financing and technical-assistance needs
of nonprofit-sponsored businesses. (Many of these
were formed on the sheltered-work model, which
creates a business for the purpose of employing
and training people who need intensive support
before they are ready to compete in the open labor
market.) The study found the capital problem was
especially acute when a social-purpose business:
begins to grow and needs to expand its facilities,
equipment, staff, inventory or some combination
of these, in order to keep up with demand. By 
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this point, many nonprofit organizations are effec-
tively “tapped out” — they have already invested
whatever discretionary funds might have been
available when they created the business. And
whereas potential sales growth might easily justify
a loan, there is little or nothing left to collateralize
that loan.39
This capital gap notwithstanding, social-purpose
businesses that manage to develop a large
enough revenue base still might be able to gener-
ate their own working capital, and thereby
become less dependent on government and phil-
anthropic funders.
Even more ambitious than these social-purpose
businesses, which accept the need for some subsidy,
is the idea of totally self-sufficient social enter-
prises, designed explicitly to generate revenue to
support the nonprofit’s mission. Several observers
are cautious about the prospects for these. Dees
points to research findings that over 70 percent of
all business start-ups fail within eight years, sug-
gesting that a social-enterprise path is hardly a
guarantee of success, or even any easier than tradi-
tional fund-raising.40 Jim Thalhuber of the Nation
Center for Social Entrepreneurs makes a similar
point, suggesting that many nonprofit managers
ought to start thinking like entrepreneurs, seizing
the opportunities available within the world of sub-
sidies, before starting real businesses. 41 One
observer argued in an interview: “Most nonprofits
aren’t ready for this. They don’t have enough staff,
risk tolerance or enough commitment to growth.”
Others question whether self-sufficiency may
even be a harmful goal. Joshua Wallack, in an
analysis of 14 social-purpose businesses, argues
that profitability should be a secondary goal in
many social enterprises.42 It may be better, for
example, to offer extensive sheltered-work oppor-
tunities to some clients, even if it requires a sub-
sidy. Seeking profits first might create a work
environment unsuitable for the very clients meant
to benefit from the program.
Though it may represent a healthy affirmation
of innovation, risk-taking and determination,
social enterprise can hardly be a panacea to the
capital challenges of nonprofits. Self-sufficiency is
not always feasible nor, given the potential con-
flicts with mission, is it always desirable.
Grow Nonprofits
Since it is small nonprofits that tend to face the
biggest barriers to capital, some observers reason
that we should encourage the development of
fewer, larger nonprofits. Bigger nonprofits, in
short, get more capital. If we exclude religious
nonprofits and private foundations, about five per-
cent of organizations that have enough revenue to
require them to file statements with the IRS con-
trol 80 percent of the assets among those organiza-
tions.43 Closer to community development, a
recent study of CDFIs, for example, showed five
percent of the sample organizations controlled 49
percent of the capital. 44
Clara Miller of the Nonprofit Finance Fund
describes access to capital as a function of both the
organization’s size and the complexity of its finan-
cial needs. Big and small nonprofits alike, if they
need only simple loans, can work with banks. Big
nonprofits seeking more complex forms of finance
— such as tax-exempt bonds — can still find
underwriters or investment banks willing to service
them. It is the small nonprofits that want access to
more complex forms of capital that face the most
daunting challenges.
Though Miller doesn’t argue that small non-
profits should grow their way into a more friendly
market, others do. Several argued that CDCs, in
particular, suffered from their small scale: they
have trouble generating development fees because
of their small markets; they lack the capital to
develop big projects; and they suffer from ineffi-
ciencies because they end up managing a relatively
small asset base. “Why have 2,000 small CDCs
each managing 250 housing units unprofitably,”
asks one, “when you should really have lots fewer,
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each managing thousands of units profitably?”
Some responded by arguing that small nonprofits
often fill important but narrow niches by offering
specialized services or dealing with specialized
client populations.
It is possible to improve access to capital with-
out necessarily growing an organization. Secondary
markets, says Frank Altman, can help “hundreds 
of organizations with little pots of money” get
more capital into their communities, often target-
ing capital where it is most needed because their
small size gets them closer to the grass roots. And
strategic alliances of many kinds — joint ventures,
subcontracts or variations on health care’s preferred
provider networks — can allow nonprofits to
attain the benefits of scale without having to grow.
Convert to For-Profit Status 
Another option, rarely noted because it’s rarely fea-
sible, is for a capital-starved nonprofit to convert to
for-profit status as a means of accessing the private
capital markets. The logic is straightforward: since
nonprofits are prohibited from distributing profits,
and therefore cannot attract investors, convert them
to social-purpose businesses that benefit both a
mission and their investors.
That is a plausible strategy only in certain cir-
cumstances. First, the nonprofit seeking to convert
must be in a profitable market that will reward
investors with steady and growing revenues. While
conversions of nonprofit hospitals to for-profit 
status increased steadily over a 20-year period, they
were driven entirely by the prospects for profitabil-
ity. When profitability declined, in part because 
of caps on spending by Medicaid and Medicare,
“deconversion” — from for-profit to nonprofit —
actually outpaced conversions.45 Second, much of
the logic of investment turns on scale: greater
profits come with growth, and, by the same token,
larger size enables organizations to raise money by
issuing publicly traded shares of stock. For a non-
profit to convert to for-profit status without the
benefits of operating and investment scale may 
not make sense. It may simply convert from a
struggling nonprofit to a struggling for-profit.
Meanwhile, the new for-profit would no longer 
be eligible for philanthropic funding.
● ● ●
Reforming philanthropy to increase working capital
and then reforming nonprofits to encourage self-
sufficiency would go a long way toward addressing the
working capital problems of nonprofits. But they pale
next to the prospect of easy access to the private capital
market, the final strategy in our review.
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Strategy #4
Expanding Access to Private
Capital Markets
PERHAPS THE MOST ATTRACTIVE STRATEGIES for
better capitalizing the work of nonprofits are those
that aim to improve the access of nonprofits to the
private capital markets, where hundreds of thou-
sands of individual and institutional investors are
seeking investment opportunities to suit many
tastes. The private capital market — with its vast
sums — has enormous appeal to nonprofits accus-
tomed to small and unreliable flows of philan-
thropic and public funds. The challenge is to find
spots where the missions of nonprofits and the
objectives of investors intersect.
Although they all rely on access to these huge
capital markets as their lever, the strategies
reviewed below stress different means toward that
end, with four tactics predominating:
➤ Institutional strategies. When willing investors and
appropriate finance tools are available, new insti-
tutions — able to work with distressed communi-
ties and investors — are sometimes seen as the
critical resource.
➤ Technical innovation. Many finance techniques
that are standard in business remain exotic to non-
profits. Several efforts aim to adapt the most
promising of these financing tools for use by non-
profits, thereby helping them reach private
investors.
➤ Government policy. Even with appropriate tools
and institutions, many investors find community
development or other nonprofit opportunities too
risky, which has prompted public policymakers to
offer various incentives and regulations to induce
more investment.
➤ Investor behavior. Even when government induce-
ments are not available, it still may be possible to
cultivate a new breed of social investors who will-
ingly invest part of their portfolio in community
development or other nonprofit opportunities.
These tactics (which in some cases are com-
bined) help nonprofits access different forms of
capital. While some of them generate sought-after
working capital, most actually generate or expand
permanent capital pools that nonprofits are
charged with lending and investing as part of their
community development activities. The result, in
some cases, is that nonprofits can gain a toehold in
the huge private capital markets but may still lack
working capital for their own operations.
Institutional Strategies
Particularly over the past 15 years, a growing num-
ber of lending and investment institutions have
been designed to help low-income communities
access philanthropic, public and private capital to
support their mission of community development.
The larger universe of these institutions — and
one notable subsector — are described below.
Community Development Financial Institutions.
The term Community Development Financial
Institution (CDFI) emerged in the early 1990s 
as advocates from a number of specialized commu-
nity development finance organizations began 
to advance a more coherent and comprehensive
agenda. Both the name and the field became 
more prominent with the passage of the Riegle
Community Development and Financial Institu-
tions Act of 1994. This law directed the Treasury
Department to establish the CDFI Fund, which
provides relatively small capital infusions to CDFIs
that meet its criteria for advancing community
development. Over $300 million has been awarded
to date.
Though the term describes the mission they
share, CDFIs themselves take many forms, includ-
ing community development loan funds, credit
unions, community development banks, venture
capital funds, microenterprise loan funds or even
commercial banks or their subsidiaries. They offer
both debt and equity, including mortgages for
affordable housing, community facilities financing,
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commercial loans and investments for business
development, and finance for housing rehabilita-
tion, construction or acquisition.
National Community Capital, as an association
for the field, conducted a detailed study of 51 of
an estimated 475 CDFIs to identify critical char-
acteristics and challenges.46 They found:
➤ CDFIs were better capitalized in 1998 than 1997,
with the sample’s aggregate base up 56 percent for
a total of $742 million.
➤ Only about 25 percent of the sample’s capital was
liquid, indicating that most of the capital is at
work in investments and debt aimed at community
development.
➤ Though they are making progress, most CDFIs
are not self-sufficient. Forty-nine percent of the
sample was able to cover 70 percent or more of its
operating costs through earned income, up from
39 percent the previous year.
➤ The cumulative loss rate was 1.7 percent.
➤ Consistent with the distribution of assets in the
nonprofit sector at large, the five largest CDFIs 
in the sample held 49 percent of the sample’s 
total assets.
➤ The smallest 10 CDFIs accounted for only 1.2 per-
cent of the sample’s total aggregate capital base.
As these findings suggest, CDFIs represent a
maturing institutional strategy, and form the base
on which other efforts to attract private capital
can build.
Community Development Venture Capital
Funds (CDVCFs). CDVCFs represent only a 
small share of CDFIs and an even smaller share 
of the entire nonprofit capital system, but they 
are important because they attempt to provide
equity capital — as opposed to debt — to new 
or growing businesses, often in economically
depressed communities.
According to the Community Development
Venture Capital Alliance (CDVCA), there are 
over 50 funds, with over $300 million under man-
agement. The average median capitalization per
fund was $9.6 million.47 CDVCFs typically make
investments of $100,000 to $1 million in compa-
nies with as few as 10 to as many as 100 employ-
ees. Although some fund sponsors are incorporated
as for-profits, most were started by nonprofit com-
munity development organizations that discovered
that “debt simply was not an option” for many of
the businesses they wanted to grow. 48
Mainstream venture capital is a high-risk
investment strategy, and community development
venture capital is even riskier on several counts,
most related to its small scale. The funds are gen-
erally working not only in depressed areas but in
small markets within them — often a specific
neighborhood. This reduces the chances of their
finding viable (much less extremely profitable)
business propositions. While mainstream venture
capitalists vet on average between 450 to 500 pro-
posals to find a small handful worth backing,
CD venture capitalists have much smaller pools 
to choose from. 49
In addition to serving small areas, the funds
themselves have small asset bases. Their average
capital base of $5.8 million (compared to the aver-
age $80 million mainstream venture capital fund),
does not usually generate enough income to pay
for the fund management. A fund of that size,
with a standard 2.5 percent management fee and
two full-time staff, generally requires a subsidy of
$75,000 per year to sustain itself. 50 Most observers
consider $10 million to be the minimum for creat-
ing a self-sustaining fund. 51
But as Kerwin Tesdell of the CDVCA points
out, many of the newer funds may well prove to be
self-sustaining over a longer period of time; if sev-
eral profitable deals pay off, they could well cover
expenses incurred over a number of years.
With small portfolios and target markets,
CDVCFs have fewer opportunities for big profits.
The companies they back are often not likely to
reach the stage where they can issue stock, which
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means there are few opportunities for the initial
CDVCF to sell its stake and take a profit that
could be reinvested in other deals. And the small,
less profitable investments of CDVCFs cost as
much as larger deals because the “level of assistance
required for often lower-skilled entrepreneurs in
distressed areas can be substantially greater.” 52
A recent analysis by policy student Luiz Lopez
explores a troubling consequence of these difficul-
ties: CDVCFs have difficulty attracting investment
capital. Current investors are primarily motivated
by social concerns, not financial return, keeping
CDVCFs at the margins of the mainstream mar-
ket. Given all these difficulties, it is not surprising
that a 1992 study by the Community Development
Research Center found that more than 40 percent
of CDVCFs that started venture capital funds later
abandoned them.53 
None of this means, of course, that the mission
of CDVCFs is not compelling or worth the trou-
ble. Nor is every CDVCF a small-scale struggling
enterprise. DVCRF Ventures — for Delaware
Valley Community Reinvestment Fund — is one
of a few especially promising leaders in the field.
One of a number of work-force and community
development programs operated by the parent
Reinvestment Fund, DVCRF Ventures has
amassed a $10 million capital base after only two
and a half years. According to Fund president
Jeremy Nowak, about half the 26 limited partners
are high net-worth individuals, and the other half
are institutions — including foundations, banks
and other venture capital firms.
The Fund’s objective is the creation of good
entry-level jobs in greater Philadelphia. The eight
companies in their first-round portfolio have cre-
ated 750 jobs in less than three years — a figure
expected to surpass 1,000 by 2001. All the jobs pay
a minimum hourly wage of $9 and offer medical
benefits. The companies are in high-end manufac-
turing and fast-growth service areas, including call
centers and child-care centers.
Though the Fund’s staff and partners’ network
can deliver general management and strategy assis-
tance to the investees, it focuses its value-added
assistance on human resource issues. Specifically,
it helps employers recruit, retain and develop
entry-level employees by drawing on the resources
of the work-force development subsidiary of the
parent nonprofit.
The prospects for CDVCFs may improve fur-
ther as the field matures and works on educating
investors and policymakers. The Community
Development Venture Capital Alliance, in addition
to advocacy and learning, has established its own
central fund to help capitalize CDVCFs. With
$3.4 million from the CDFI Fund and $2 million
in PRIs from the Ford Foundation, it is aiming for
$10 million.
Technical Innovation
The last five years have seen several important
technical innovations aimed at helping nonprofits
access the private capital markets.
Two of them — the Capital Markets Access
Program and the Community Economic Develop-
ment Program of New Hampshire College — 
are developing a comprehensive approach to this
strategy. The Capital Markets Access Program,
a program at the New School University run by
Greg Stanton, is a combination think tank and
laboratory. It convenes practitioners from commu-
nity development finance and the investment
community to develop new mechanisms for
enhancing capital access, while it also functions as
a technical-assistance resource, helping nonprofits
access lower-cost debt, improve cash flow through 
bridge financing and issue tax-exempt bonds.
New Hampshire College is just organizing a
Financial Innovations Roundtable, where commu-
nity development finance specialists will work
with investment and finance experts to explore
similar strategies.
Already, the Capital Markets Access Program
has sharpened what some observers see as a fun-
damental challenge in accessing private capital
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markets. As one observer from community devel-
opment finance described it, strategies like these
assume “we’re trying to build a bridge across the
Charles River when it’s really the Pacific Ocean.”
He observes that Wall Street finance experts come
to the conversation with the “assumption that
‘once you see how much money we have — you’ll
do whatever it takes to get access’.” The com-
munity development finance practitioners, mean-
while, come to the conversation saying, “We need
[what investors would consider] illiquid, low-cost,
high-risk capital.” The capital markets, in other
words, would have no interest in community
development.
As another observer worried, if nonprofits push
too hard to make themselves appealing to main-
stream markets, they will abandon the kinds of
difficult, riskier and unusual deals that they were
created to develop in the first place.
Several promising innovations, however, sug-
gest that there are some opportunities for progress
short of such a difficult trade-off.
Secondary Markets. Effective secondary mar-
kets have enormous appeal for lenders. In a 
secondary market, a lender can sell all of the out-
standing debt it has issued to individual con-
sumers, and then use the capital raised by the sale
to make a new generation of loans. The purchaser
of the debt can hold the mortgages, or as is often
done, convert them into bonds and sell them to
other investors. This is the practice that Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac have perfected for single-
family home mortgages, and its success in replen-
ishing the capital pool of lenders is credited 
with the high rate of homeownership in the
United States.
Community developers have been working for
over 10 years to extend secondary markets from
single-family homeownership to multi-family and
other economic development projects. Public and
nonprofit loan funds hold an estimated $4 billion
in loan assets that support community develop-
ment projects. Generally, these lenders (who are
“loan originators” in the secondary market food
chain) support multi-family mortgages and eco-
nomic development projects.54 They have assem-
bled their original capital pools with difficulty,
combining public, philanthropic and social-invest-
ment dollars to reach a critical mass. “To survive,”
according to financial analysts Kathleen Kenny
and Frank Altman, “community development
lenders must look to an emerging secondary mar-
ket to replenish their capital.” 55
The Community Reinvestment Fund (CRF),
formed in 1988 in Minnesota, pioneered creating 
a secondary market for community development
loans. Capitalized by foundations and corpora-
tions, CRF has purchased more than 700 economic
development and housing loans from 73 loan funds
in 18 states, returning more than $114 million 
into the community development lending system.
Though it holds much of the debt it acquires
(sometimes leaving the servicing of the loan with
the original lender), it has issued 10 series of
Community Reinvestment Bonds totaling $34 mil-
lion to 30 investors.
Kenny and Altman point out that the emerging
market faces several challenges. Chief among them
is a lack of shared practices among the community
development lenders. Consistent loan documenta-
tion, common approaches to underwriting and
uniform risk-weighting practices are the key to
successful markets because they improve the infor-
mation available, make transactions more efficient
and, in the process, reduce the cost and risk of the
transactions. Unfortunately, the local, usually
small, loan funds do not enjoy any of these stan-
dardization benefits. The “financial infrastructure”
— like a “ ‘string’ of relationships along the financ-
ing pipeline from loan originators to investors” —
is also weaker and less predictable than its private
counterparts. Finally, pricing is a problem, in that
originators often lack the experience and knowl-
edge needed to value their assets for sale in a
mainstream marketplace.
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Because of these obstacles, and the nature of
the underlying loans, the secondary market “may
always require some form of credit enhancement
to attract large numbers of investors.” Foundations
or socially responsible investors, for example, can
take higher-risk stakes in intermediaries like CRF.
The flagship in the secondary market, the
Local Initiatives Managed Assets Corporation
(LIMAC), illustrates a second-generation innova-
tion aimed at improving the secondary market 
for community development lenders. Created by
the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC),
LIMAC’s goal was to purchase mortgages on
properties (e.g., small, scatter-site or assisted-
living) not normally served by the mainstream sec-
ondary market. Capitalized with grants and PRIs
from foundations, it had steadily increased its pur-
chases of loans, until its own capital base dwindled
to $4.5 million, raising the question of how to
expand the secondary market if upstream funds
were drying up.
Like many other nonprofits, LIMAC wanted
what nonprofits cannot get: equity from investors.
It resorted to conversion to for-profit status, just as
insurers and hospitals facing capital crunches have
over the past 20 years. By converting itself to a
real-estate investment trust (REIT), though,
LIMAC got the best of both worlds. It could
access capital from investors but take advantage of
the fact that REITs do not pay corporate income
tax. (A REIT combines the capital of many
investors to acquire real estate or provide financing
for it; it functions like a mutual fund for investors,
offering them diversification but no property man-
agement responsibility.) 
The REIT operator, the for-profit Community
Development Trust (CDT), launched in 1998,
quickly assembled a capital base of more than 
$30 million. LISC contributed $1.5 million, and 
a group of 18 investors (including Prudential
Insurance, Fannie Mae and Met Life) invested as
well. LISC has seven of 15 board seats, with other
investors holding the balance. The Trust, in addition
to purchasing community development loans, will
also acquire selected affordable-housing properties
through a swap with owners who, for tax planning
reasons, would rather own units in a REIT than
individual properties. CDT will commit to long-
term ownership of the affordable housing.
Tax-Exempt Bonds. Larger nonprofits long had
the option of issuing tax-exempt bonds if they
could secure the sponsorship of a willing govern-
ment agency (often a state facilities authority). The
transaction costs for evaluating, underwriting and
servicing bonds, however, have typically been too
high for smaller nonprofit organizations. An inno-
vation developed to service the needs of smaller
community health providers could offer a model
for other smaller nonprofits.
The Community Health Facilities Fund
(CHFF) was incorporated as a nonprofit by three
national associations representing local community
health organizations. Capitalized with PRIs from
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the Fund
is managed under contract by the firm of Capital
Express Limited, LLC. The Fund is a vital link
between the nonprofits and the investment com-
munity, and can package and explain nonprofits’
needs in ways the market can accept. This inter-
mediary function is critical. As Tuckman points
out in a review of various nonprofit finance tools,
“Bond houses are not likely to issue bonds in many
of the areas in which nonprofits might wish to
borrow because of the effort involved in develop-
ing loan criteria and in learning the intricacies of 
a new industry.” 56
The Fund’s biggest job with investors is to
explain the nature of the nonprofits’ government
funding. Although backed by real estate, under-
writers need evidence of reliable income, and
those unfamiliar with nonprofits are apt to see all
government funding as unreliable. Nonprofits
offering government-funded services that might
be considered essential are the most attractive to
investors. A provider of residential care to the
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severely disabled, for example, is unlikely to have
its government funding disrupted, since these
clients are entirely dependent on the service and
the government has no easy alternative. In con-
trast, a provider of job training and placement
services — which are not considered essential —
is much more at the whim of changing public
policies and would be a much higher risk.
The Fund also works intensively to educate
nonprofits about the advantages of debt in general,
and lower cost tax-exempt debt in particular.
According to the Fund’s research, debt as a share
of total assets is 50 percent for the largest nonprof-
its (with budgets of over $50 million), and a quar-
ter of that debt is in the form of tax-exempt
bonds. For smaller nonprofits (with budgets of 
$1 million to $10 million), debt is generally only
20 percent as a share of total assets and, of that,
only five percent is in the form of tax-exempt
bonds. Consequently, the Fund serves only a small
slice of a huge market — the small to medium-
sized nonprofits with assets and income between
$500,000 and $20 million, seeking average loans 
of $1.5 million. It figures that total annual demand
of nonprofits in this target market might be close
to $1.5 billion.
The Fund’s first approach was to bundle the
borrowing needs of smaller nonprofits into pools
that would justify the transaction costs of issuing
the bonds. This process forced each participating
nonprofit to wait until all others in the pool were
ready to participate in the bond issue, creating
long delays for many of the nonprofits. Under a
new securitization model, the Fund is able to pro-
vide debt finance to nonprofits on a rolling basis,
as soon as they have met all the requirements. The
Fund then converts the debt into investment-grade
bonds for sale in the market.
Since bonds are issued for new construction,
purchase or rehabilitation of facilities (or for refi-
nancing of them), and are secured by real estate,
they are, strictly speaking, another form of facili-
ties capital. But as Chris Conley of Capital
Express points out, “We see ourselves as enterprise
developers using real estate as collateral.” If the
facilities in question support a viable business 
plan, long-term, low-cost debt can support and
strengthen the organization’s capacity for growth.
As with all suppliers of capital to nonprofits,
the challenge is ultimately one of creating the ini-
tial capital pool. Beyond the initial PRIs from 
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the Fund 
seeks social-investment capital (at concessionary
rates) or recoverable grants to: (a) subsidize its
operating costs as intermediary; (b) provide credit
enhancement (commitments to make payments to
investors in case of default); or (c) provide “ware-
housing” — funds that enable the intermediary to
issue debt to borrowers before bonds have been
sold on the market.
Securitization of Accounts Receivable. A few
observers proposed, and then several more were
asked to react to, the idea of extending a bond
approach from facilities to working capital. They
propose that a nonprofit could raise important
sums of working capital by issuing bonds that
would be secured not by real estate but by accounts
receivable, presumably from government contracts.
There are several challenges to this securitization
approach (so-called because it converts an asset into
a security that can be sold on the market). For 
one, the risk of unsecured lending, particularly to
smaller nonprofits, would be prohibitively high,
and the idea almost by definition would require the
involvement of a philanthropic-backed intermediary
to provide credit enhancement and guarantees.
Additionally, as one observer pointed out,
securitization works in commercial markets by
exploiting huge volumes of debt with the same
characteristics. The credit-card debt held by
banks, for instance, can be converted into bonds
and sold on the market because everyone under-
stands the historic default rates, and therefore, can
assess the risk. Most of what nonprofits would
want to securitize is “non-conforming, small-scale
Technical /31Strategies and Solutions for Nonprofit Capital Problems
debt,” which would require an intermediary to
bundle it into larger-scale offerings, just as CHFF
does with facilities-backed bonds for the mental
health nonprofits.
The intermediary would doubtless have to take
on the challenge of educating potential investors
about the nature of government funding streams
(which would provide the income needed to repay
the debt). Many investors, according to the
observers who have considered this idea, consider
government funding almost entirely unreliable,
which dooms the prospects for accounts receivable
securitization. As one banker who has explored,
and likes the idea, rejoined:
Let’s not overcomplicate it. We consider U.S.
Treasuries [e.g., government-backed bonds] to be
the ultimate conservative investment, and need to
get people to see that government contracts are
ultimately backed by the same government. They
will pay. It’s true that they can change the rules of
the game, but they’re not going to do that willy
nilly. Practical and political considerations will
keep them in line.
In addition to providing credit enhancement,
an intermediary would need to assess the reliability
of various funding streams, looking for what the
operators of CHFF call “essentiality” — evidence
that the government funded service is so impor-
tant that payments are unlikely to be halted.
This idea also assumes a financially and manage-
rially sophisticated nonprofit that is able to under-
stand the role of debt in its capital structure, has
enough confidence in its plans and abilities to justify
amassing working capital, e.g., for expansion, and
the ability to participate in complex transactions.
Net-Lease Finance. Net-lease finance, sometimes
called “sell-leaseback,” allows organizations to con-
vert their real estate or equipment into working
capital. Pioneered with aircraft owners in the 1960s,
the transaction appeals to organizations that have
capital locked up in equipment and facilities, but
need cash to expand or improve their operations.57
In a typical deal, the property owner sells its
asset to a buyer who, for diversification and tax
purposes, wants to hold a depreciating asset. The
new owner then enters into a long-term, renew-
able lease, returning both control and asset-man-
agement responsibility to the previous owner, who
now has a new supply of working capital as well.
Peter Nessen of Corporate Realty Investment
Corporation (CRIC) in Boston has begun struc-
turing net-lease finance deals for nonprofits. As an
intermediary, CRIC buys the properties of non-
profits that need working capital, and then leases
the property back to the nonprofit. CRIC then
converts the leases it holds into investment-grade
bonds and sells these at market, generating income
for its investors. It also resells the newly acquired
property and collects a transaction fee from the
property seller.
The arrangement, according to Nessen, can be
extremely beneficial for nonprofits. He offers the
case of Northwestern Human Services, a multi-
state operator of residential and community-based
human service programs. Northwestern sold 
39 properties — offices, residences, community
facilities and a new juvenile detention center — for
$27 million, providing important capital at a time 
of intense competition. (Another nonprofit in the
same field, Abraxas, faced similar demands for capi-
tal and ultimately decided to allow a publicly traded
for-profit prison management firm to acquire it.58)
As with other sophisticated tools, this requires
a nonprofit with the ability to assess the benefits
and risks of such a transaction. It must be confi-
dent that working capital today is worth more
than property ownership over the long-term, and
be confident that properties are valued fairly.
Donating Debt-Encumbered Real Estate to
Nonprofits. A new product that effectively cir-
cumvents an IRS prohibition on the donation of
debt-encumbered properties to charities could
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expand the supply of working, philanthropic capi-
tal available to nonprofits.
Traditionally, only unencumbered properties —
e.g., entirely debt-free — could be donated to
nonprofit organizations. Thornburg Foundation
Realty (TFR) has created an instrument that
allows donors to make tax-deductible gifts of
encumbered properties, potentially “unlocking real
estate, the nation’s largest store of wealth” as a
greater source of capital for nonprofits.
The donor of a mortgaged property conveys it
to TFR, which operates a REIT — an instrument
that allows many investors to acquire and own
portfolios of real estate without becoming respon-
sible for property management. TFR pays off any
debt on the property, and issues REIT shares to
the owner. The property owner then donates its
shares to a nonprofit of its choice. The nonprofit
then owns shares in the REIT, which will pay
quarterly dividends.
At least initially, this promising innovation
seems likely to benefit nonprofits that already
receive gifts of property. If that is true, it seems
that neither CDCs nor work-force development
organizations would stand to benefit significantly.
Public Policy Strategies
If it were not for public policy, CDFIs might be
entirely dependent on socially motivated investors;
the risks of investing in community development
projects might simply be too high for most investors,
particularly those who are poorly informed about
low-income communities. But a combination of tax
policy and bank regulation has provided new oppor-
tunities for generating permanent capital for com-
munity development projects. The most cited public
policies are reviewed below.
Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC). This
federal tax credit, introduced in 1986, is the most
important federal program for financing the devel-
opment of affordable rental housing. The LIHTC
is no longer novel, and has long been criticized as
inefficient.59 But it is frequently mentioned in dis-
cussions about nonprofit capital for two reasons:
for its central role in supplying federal support to
capitalize affordable housing programs; and for
inspiring interest in similar efforts to support other
nonprofit programs.
To summarize this important benchmark
briefly: the LIHTC offers federal tax credits to
investors who provide equity for the development
of affordable housing. State housing finance
agencies usually administer the program —
awarding the credits, ensuring that projects meet
the specified public goals and monitoring long-
term compliance.
Developers of low-income housing apply to
their state agency for the credits, which are awarded
to developers who best satisfy the state’s goals for
affordable rental housing. When nonprofit organi-
zations are awarded tax credits, they sell them to
investors who, unlike the nonprofits, have federal
tax liabilities they would like to reduce.60
To create a more efficient market, the National
Equity Fund (NEF) (of the Local Initiatives
Support Corporation) has become a syndicator 
of the tax credits. It raises funds — $2.9 billion 
to date — from investors through the sale of
LIHTCs, and has become a vital element of the
infrastructure.
New Markets Tax Credit. This credit hopes to 
do for commercial economic development what
the LIHTC has done for affordable housing.
Enacted as part of the Clinton administration’s
New Markets program, it aims to leverage up to
$15 billion in equity investment for community
development projects and institutions.
Investment funds geared primarily to serving
low- and moderate-income communities are eligible
to apply to the Treasury Department for participa-
tion in the program. The funds can be community
development banks, community development ven-
ture capital funds, CDCs — or national or regional
funds that, in turn, invest in these institutions.
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The funds selected to participate are authorized by
Treasury to allocate credits to investors, who can
then claim tax credits worth 25 percent of their
total investment. The funds (not the investors)
decide what projects to invest in.
Welfare-to-Work Tax Credit. Though wage sub-
sidies like this are not new, a recent innovation
has enabled at least one enterprising nonprofit
venture to use the subsidies as a way to generate
working capital.
Federal law now provides a tax credit to
employers who hire long-term welfare recipients.
The credit can reduce employers’ federal tax 
liability by as much as $8,500 per new qualified
employee.
The Local Initiatives Support Corporation 
and Structured Employment and Economic
Development Corporation (SEEDCO), New
York — another community development inter-
mediary, have jointly created EarnFair, a tempo-
rary staffing company. Three features of its design
enable EarnFair to take advantage of the credit.
First, it is incorporated as a for-profit (limited 
liability corporation), and could use the credits 
to reduce its tax liability. Second, instead of 
acting only as a placement agency, EarnFair itself
becomes the employer of the eligible worker, con-
tracting with companies who use the employee 
as a temporary worker, making it eligible for the
credits. Third, it plans to sell some of the credits
to for-profits, who can reduce their tax liability
without necessarily hiring any long-term welfare
recipients. This sale of the credits will provide a
supply of working capital to help EarnFair cover
its expenses while it develops its business and
income base.
Employers who contract for EarnFair workers
pay the company a fee based in part on the job 
and the worker’s experience. The fee also covers
EarnFair’s case-management services, which will
provide support aimed at increasing the job reten-
tion of the newly placed worker.
America’s Private Investment Companies
(APIC). Modeled on the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, the APIC program uses
government guarantees of debt to leverage creation
of “a new generation of large-scale private invest-
ment companies that find and invest in promising
untapped market opportunities in distressed areas.”
Although the proposal failed to win congressional
approval, it remains a notable example of an ambi-
tious use of government policy to stimulate invest-
ment in community development.
Investment funds that secure commitments
from investors to create an APIC would apply 
to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) and the Small Business
Administration for participation in the program.
If the application to establish an APIC is approved,
HUD would award government guarantees of debt
issued by the APIC. The government would guar-
antee two dollars of debt for every dollar of equity
that investors add to the APIC.
The guarantees are meant to benefit both the
investors and the government. Deals made by 
the APIC would have favorable returns, in part
because of the low cost of the guaranteed debt.
Meanwhile, taxpayers are protected in the event of
failing investments because every dollar of equity
must be lost before any debt is affected.
The guarantees would aim to create large
investment funds able to finance major job creat-
ing businesses. Funds would be required to have a
minimum capitalization of $25 million, and each
APIC would be expected to conduct nine to 
12 large-scale deals.
Equity Equivalents. Building permanent capital
pools of CDFIs is difficult because investors find
returns on CDFIs too low, or are ignorant of the
opportunities they present. The equity equivalent
attracts private capital to CDFIs by applying gov-
ernment regulation in a new way.
The equity equivalent (EQ2) builds on the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which has
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required banks to make minimum investments or
loans in low-income communities since 1977. For
banks that are constantly searching for low-risk
ways to meet CRA requirements, EQ2 presents a
new opportunity. It allows them to receive CRA
credit not merely for the amount of the EQ2
investments they make to a CDFI, but instead for
up to 50 percent of all the loans or investments
made subsequently with funds that the CDFI was
able to leverage with the initial EQ2.
For CDFIs, the EQ2 provides capital that
functions like equity. Pioneered in a transaction
between National Community Capital (a CDFI
association) and Citibank, and later endorsed by
CRA regulators, the EQ2 is a long-term, deeply
subordinated loan that functions like equity
because:
➤ It is not secured by CDFI assets;
➤ It is fully subordinated (meaning the bank making
the loan is the last of all creditors to be paid);
➤ The lender cannot demand any acceleration of
repayment, unless the CDFI changes its primary
mission of community development; and
➤ It has a rolling term of 10 years minimum, with 
a yearly renewal option.
This is an important innovation for capitalizing
CDFIs. The larger their capital base, the lower
their cost of funds, and the lower interest the
CDFI can charge.
Social Investment Strategies
Many nonprofit analysts are looking beyond 
government policy and new finance products to
another source of capital for nonprofits and their
causes: individual and institutional investors.
“Social investing” refers primarily to three
strategies aimed at directing private capital toward
social goals:
➤ Socially responsible investment is the most common
strategy, in which investors use social, not just
financial, criteria for selecting companies to invest
in, often through mutual fund operators that
establish social standards and select companies
that meet them.
➤ Shareholder activism — with no direct benefits to
nonprofits — enables investors to use the powers
granted to every shareholder (e.g., to vote for
directors and participate in shareholder meetings)
to bend corporate policy toward more socially
suitable goals.
➤ Community investment directly benefits nonprof-
its, but is the least used strategy, in large part
because it is newer and because it requires invest-
ing in CDFIs at below-market rates of return.
According to a recent Business Week overview,
socially responsible investing, especially through
mutual funds, has grown remarkably in recent
years. Between 1997 and 1999, social investment
mutual funds grew from $96 billion to $154 bil-
lion. Over the same period, the amount of all
money under socially responsible investment grew
82 percent, from $1.2 trillion to $2.16 trillion, rep-
resenting 13 percent of all money under profes-
sional management. Some investment analysts
credit the rise of technology stocks with part of
that tremendous growth. They provide socially
responsible mutual fund operators an excellent
opportunity: most are considered socially “clean,”
as well as profitable.61
Options for Individual Investors. The dollar vol-
ume of social investment is up, and so is the variety
of causes investors can support. The original prac-
tice, as far back as the eighteenth century, simply
aimed at avoiding the “sin stocks” of companies
that traded in tobacco, alcohol and gambling. The
mutual fund strategies made popular in the 1970s
favored progressive policies like environmental
safety, prohibitions on child labor and equal rights
for gay employees. The newest fund options are
conservative, focusing on companies that decline to
offer health benefits to the partners of gay employ-
ees or that have no involvement in abortion.62
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Under the more socially ambitious but finan-
cially unimpressive “community investment,”
investors can invest directly in CDFIs, or in mutual
funds with stakes in a variety of CDFIs. While
conceding that the financial returns are modest,
proponents of community investment argue that
the “benefits at the community level in many cases
outweigh diminished financial returns, making
community investing one of the most satisfying
and promising venues for socially responsible
investors in the future.”
The Calvert Social Investment Foundation
operates Calvert Community Investments, which
allows individual and institutional investors to
invest in CDFIs. Calvert offers information on
over 100 CDFIs online, where investors can learn
about the CDFI’s portfolio (housing, small busi-
ness, micro-lending, etc.); geographic area of oper-
ations; populations served; and assets. Investors
can purchase a Community Investment Note in an
amount of $1,000 or higher, choosing a term of
one, three or five years, and choose a fixed rate of
return between 0 to 4 percent, depending on how
charitable the investor wants to be. Investors can
take a mutual fund approach — investing in a
block of CDFIs selected by Calvert — or, for
investments of $25,000 or more, make a direct
investment in one or more CDFIs.63
Domini Social Investment, which operates the
largest socially screened index mutual fund, has
created a new product that combines socially
responsible and community investment. The new
Domini Social Bond Fund is a socially screened
mutual fund that will be operated under a sub-
management agreement by South Shore Bank, the
country’s largest community development bank.
South Shore will invest up to 10 percent of assets
in debt instruments and other investments that
directly support and promote community develop-
ment. A.G. Edwards, Inc., is developing a “socially
responsible equity linked note” that also attempts
to enable nonprofits to benefit by participating in
investment transactions.
Options for Institutional Investors. Govern-
ment policies to encourage “economically targeted
investments” were promoted by the Clinton
administration in its early years but never gained
congressional approval. Many advocates of com-
munity development had argued for years that
institutional investors — particularly pension
funds, with billions of dollars under management
— could supply relatively enormous amounts of
private capital for community development by tar-
geting only a small share of their portfolios toward
such investments. Conservatives opposed the con-
cept as mischievous social engineering that would
force investment managers to violate their fiduci-
ary responsibility to maximize earnings.
Absent government inducements or regulation,
institutional social investment is the province of
the socially motivated. Pension fund managers 
are still able, of course, to make investments that
reflect both financial and social objectives. And
social investment proponents are working to con-
vince institutional investors to channel one percent
of their capital to community investments. But
many now view foundations — who have over
$350 billion in assets — as an appealing source of
new capital for social-purpose businesses. Beyond
the social screening that many already do, founda-
tions could devote some of their assets (not just
grant dollars) to social-purpose businesses.
A number of foundations are experimenting
with such approaches. The F. B. Heron Foundation
has made some investments in commercial real-
estate developments that will bring shopping
malls, badly needed retail operators and jobs to
economically distressed central-city locations.
While the investments may well prove profitable,
none of the present investors in the real-estate
deals is, according to one program officer, “indif-
ferent to social concern.”
The Rockefeller Foundation has established a
formal program to find and make social invest-
ments. The Foundation’s ProVenEx (for Program
Venture Experiment) program “seeks to redirect
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private capital, knowledge and innovation in ways
to ensure that the poor and excluded have access
to the benefits of globalization.” It invests in early
or expansion-stage companies, or in public-private
joint ventures in areas that reflect the Foundation’s
philanthropic priorities in education, health and
inner-city employment.
● ● ●
Clearly, the appeal of private capital access is enor-
mous. But its real potential for nonprofits may be
somewhat restricted. Many of the funds provide per-
manent capital for community development organiza-
tions to invest in the economic development of their
target areas, without necessarily satisfying their own
need for nonprofit working capital. To meet the non-
profit capital challenge in its entirety will therefore
likely require more than access to private capital.
The best approach will probably draw on several of
the strategies reviewed in this paper.
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IF THIS PAPER REPRESENTS A MAP OF SORTS that describes the nonprofitcapital landscape, it will be difficult to draw a single key lesson from it.Different parts of it will have different values depending on where it is the
reader is trying to go. But it’s fair to assume that anyone who has actually pored
over this whole map has an interest in understanding and advancing the dia-
logue about nonprofit capital. These brief concluding reflections therefore focus
on that dialogue, and how it might be improved to generate yet more effective
responses to nonprofit capital problems.
 Focusing the Dialogue. 
The idea that different nonprofits need different types of capital for different
purposes is almost self-evident. Yet the general discourse among both nonprofit
managers and funders seems to make few of these distinctions. It might be
helpful, therefore, to develop a more refined assessment of the capital needs of
any given nonprofit, or class of nonprofits. Drawing on the simple distinctions
offered in part two of this paper — about facilities, working and permanent cap-
ital — it would be fairly easy to characterize the overall capital position of a
nonprofit, or a group of similar nonprofits.
Some nonprofits will have intense capital needs: they might be in competi-
tive markets that require capital; need improved facilities to offer quality serv-
ices; deal with capital-intensive development programs; and perform so well
that investing in their capacity for effectiveness will likely pay off. But most
nonprofits do not need capital on all these counts. We can be more focused —
by industry, by organizational profile, by market position — in contemplating
solutions to capital needs. It’s not enough to talk about “nonprofits,” “funders”
and “capital.”
 Broadening the Dialogue. 
Paradoxically, it seems that we need to broaden — as well as focus — the dia-
logue about capital. The leaders, managers and proponents of each of the four
strategies mapped in this paper seem to inhabit quite separate worlds. Those
working on access to the private capital markets have amassed extraordinary
expertise, which has been deployed mostly in the community and economic
development arena. Many of their finance strategies, however, could be of great
value to the broader field. At the same time, those working on reforming phi-
lanthropy are not explicitly targeted at community development. Yet they have




facing nonprofit economic development organizations: how to invest in organi-
zational capacity that produces results. More traffic among the proponents of
various strategies could give everyone a stronger conceptual and practical base
for serving their missions.
 Deepening the Dialogue. 
At the risk of presenting a baffling image of this proposed dialogue, one more
feature should be added: depth. It seems that the more we have developed con-
sensus, capacity and sophisticated innovation on any of the capital strategies,
the further we get from the underlying assumptions and rationales for them.
To take an example hinted at in the discussion about reforming nonprofits: We
have a broad consensus about the need for nonprofits to become self-sustaining
social enterprises, and about the benefits that strategy confers. Yet revisiting
some of those assumptions might stimulate yet more creative responses. Are 
we really living in an age of scarcity — with declining government and philan-
thropic funding — that requires self-sufficient nonprofits? Is extending the 
discipline of the market the only framework for thinking about nonprofits’
impact? Couldn’t we develop, for instance, a capital framework that is built on
the discipline of market failure — identifying and giving priority to exactly
those areas where the market, and public funding, do not reach effectively?
Each of the strategies in play today is built on deep layers of assumptions.
While we’re busy with technical innovations, it might be productive to revisit
those assumptions and question them, so as perhaps to become inspired by new
problems and possibilities.
● ● ●
Even if we thought a more focused — yet broader and deeper — capital dialogue
were valuable, how would we achieve it? It would be foolish to attempt to engineer
such a comprehensive approach to a problem so broad that it belongs to everyone in
the nonprofit sector. Instead, it would probably do if more of the innovators and pro-
ponents of the various capital strategies continued to work in their chosen areas but
occasionally crossed their boundaries into nearby territory, which this mapping exer-
cise may facilitate.
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Abramson, Alan J., Lester M. Salamon, and C. Eugene
Steuerle. “The Nonprofit Sector and the Federal
Budget: Recent History and Future Directions” in
Nonprofits and Government: Collaboration and Conflict,
Elizabeth T. Boris and C. Eugene Steuerle, editors.
(Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute) 1999.
This comprehensive and influential analysis tracks federal
spending from 1980 to 1997. It concludes that budget shifts
in this period “generally increased the pressures on nonprofit
organizations to expand their services while reducing the
resources they had available to do so, at least outside the
health field.” The analysis also considers whether charitable
giving offset the federal cuts, and concludes that while philan-
thropy did compensate for direct losses to nonprofits, it did
not offset declines in “areas of interest to nonprofits” — a
broader category that describes direct federal spending and
spending channeled through nonprofits. The authors are at
pains to demonstrate that nonprofits and their causes have
suffered as a result of federal spending shifts, e.g., real
increases in spending are given a negative cast when expressed
as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). But they give
little attention to other important factors, e.g., the rise of state
and local spending to offset federal spending cuts and the use
of tax credits in areas like community development — that
suggest that overall public funding may in fact have increased.
Dees, J. Gregory. “Enterprising Nonprofits,” Harvard
Business Review, January-February 1998.
This piece analyzes the rationales of, and prospects for,
nonprofits that develop revenue-generating programs or sub-
sidiaries. Enterprise activities appeal to nonprofits because
they face “rising costs, more competition for fewer donations
and grants, and increased rivalry from for-profits.” They are
also seeking “the holy grail of financial sustainability.” Dees
offers a social enterprise spectrum, which runs from purely
philanthropic to purely commercial nonprofits. In the middle
are blended organizations — where revenues cover many
costs, but not the start-up and initial capitalization. Dees then
outlines some of the serious tensions and risks that nonprofits
need to manage in seeking commercial income. These include:
(a) following revenue, even when it leads away from mission;
(b) failure of the enterprise; and (c) alienating important con-
stituencies (including staff ) that might not like the culture or
consequences of commercialization. He urges nonprofits to
hire more business-oriented staff, but only if they are willing
to accept the challenge of building an organizational culture
that accommodates and values them.
Emerson, Jed, Jay Wachowicz, and Suzi Chun. Social
Return on Investment: Exploring Aspects of Value
Creation in the Nonprofit Sector. (San Francisco: The
Roberts Enterprise Development Fund) 1999. (Available
at www.redf.org)
The authors argue for the general usefulness of new methods
for quantifying the “social return on investments” (SROI)
made by philanthropic and public funders, and then discuss in
detail prototypical metrics and the challenges they present.
They argue that the “true impact of the collective work taking
place in the nonprofit sector is grossly undervalued by both
those within and outside of the sector,” and that better infor-
mation about the value created by nonprofits could increase
public support for nonprofit work, and even improve the com-
pensation of nonprofit workers. The paper explicates the
SROI model used by the Roberts Enterprise Development
Fund (REDF) during a two-year pilot effort to measure the
value created by the foundation’s grantees. The model
attempts to capture three types of return generated by 
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nonprofits: economic value (embodied in products or services
offered in the market); social value (reflected in the improved
quality of life of clients or program participants); and socio-
economic value (representing the savings to society generated
by nonprofits, which relieve the public sector of potentially
more expensive, remedial service-delivery over time). The
most pressing challenges in the evolving SROI model are
finding an appropriate discount rate for SROI calculations
and valuing the degree of difficulty of nonprofit work.
Emerson, Jed. The U.S. Nonprofit Capital Market: 
An Introductory Overview of Developmental Stages,
Investors and Funding Instruments. Unpublished 
manuscript, 1998. (Available at www.redf.org)
The author argues that the various sources of funds available
to nonprofits should be viewed as a capital market — not
“simply a variety of charitable fundraising efforts.” In its pres-
ent state, the nonprofit capital market “does not offer enough
capital in the size, form and appropriate stages required to be
of greatest use to the nonprofit sector.” After presenting a
detailed typology of funders, Emerson reviews the major bar-
riers that inhibit the development of a more productive non-
profit capital market. Chief among them is the “equity gap” —
the inability of many nonprofits to accumulate surpluses or
reserves that can support their growth or improvement. He
goes on to enumerate over a dozen other barriers — ranging
from lack of metrics for tracking “return on investment” to the
complacency of foundations that could learn from more can-
did review of failures in grantmaking.
Grossman, Allen. Philanthropic Social Capital Markets:
Performance-Driven Philanthropy. Working paper,
Harvard Business School, 2000.
This analysis depicts the nonprofit funding environment as
disorganized, inefficient and ultimately hostile to the needs
of nonprofit organizations attempting to grow or improve
their performance. “It is the absolute amount of capital, the
stages at which it is available during organizational develop-
ment and the conditions of its acquisition that all work
together to create a powerful influence on management
behavior and organizational culture.” After analyzing the
ways in which nonprofit managers are disadvantaged by this
ineffective market, the author argues that part of the solution
lies in the reform of philanthropy — to create large pools of
capital aimed at meeting the unique needs of nonprofits at
their various stages of development.
Jegen, David L. “Community Development Venture
Capital: Creating a Viable Business Model for the Future,”
Nonprofit Management and Leadership (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass) Winter 1998, Volume 9, No. 2.
Based on an analysis of nine community development venture
capital funds (CDVCF), the author explicates several of the
tensions between profitability and social returns. Although he
is generally sanguine about the usefulness of the funds, he
points out that CDVCFs share all the disadvantages and risks
of traditional venture capital funds — and more. If the aver-
age venture firm will lose money on over a third of its invest-
ments, CDVCFs can expect to lose more because they deal
with less experienced businesses and must choose (because of
mission and geographic preferences) from a much smaller
pool of potential companies. This in turn limits the number 
of big wins and even viable exit possibilities from their invest-
ments. They are also constrained by their very small fund size
and an inability to attract co-investors, which leaves some of
them unable to cover typical operating costs of $75,000 per
year. Jegen points to two advantages of CDVCFs: their deep
roots in their communities give them access to the best local
prospects; and their common experience working with very
new entrepreneurs positions them to help the most promising
but inexperienced ones develop business plans and strategies.
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Morino Institute. Venture Philanthropy: Landscape and
Expectations. Undated report produced for the Morino
Institute/Youth Social Ventures by Community Wealth
Ventures, Inc. 
Prepared to inform the development of a philanthropic 
venture fund targeting youth-serving nonprofits in the
Washington D.C. area, this report reviews the emergence of
“venture philanthropy” as a concept and offers examples of
over 20 funders using venture capital investing techniques. It
proposes a continuum of “return expectations” — with tradi-
tional philanthropy at one extreme, traditional venture capital
at the other and social venture funds in the middle ground,
where both financial and social returns are in play.
Proscio, Tony. A Double “Bottom Line”: Lessons 
on Social-Purpose Enterprise from the Venture Fund
Initiative, a summary of The Venture Fund Initiative: 
An Assessment of Current Opportunities for Social-
Purpose Business Development, and Recommendations
for Advancing the Field (San Francisco: Roberts
Economic Development Fund) 1999.
This report offers highlights of findings from the Venture
Fund Initiative (VFI). Funded by six national foundations
with matching grants from seven local funders in six cities,
VFI enabled a number of funders and nonprofits to experi-
ment with new funding strategies for nonprofits that were
operating social-purpose businesses. Among the major find-
ings: most social-purpose businesses need more capacity for
business planning and market analysis; better access to busi-
ness expertise and technical assistance; access to specialized
resources (like information technology and legal and tax serv-
ices); help raising capital, particularly equity; and both board
of directors and funders with experience and knowledge useful
to growing businesses.
Smith, Steven Rathgeb. “Government Financing of
Nonprofit Activity.” Nonprofits and Government:
Collaboration and Conflict, Elizabeth T. Boris and C.
Eugene Steuerle, editors. (Washington, D.C.: The Urban
Institute) 1999.
This piece provides an overview of the government financing
of nonprofits, which has seen a “marked increase, albeit quite
variable depending upon the state, in government funding of
nonprofit activities.” The author reviews trends and practices
in government grants, contracts and payments through third
parties, as well as tax credits, public bonding and regulation
(e.g., via the Community Reinvestment Act). He also reviews
alternatives to government funding, and offers some analysis
of their impacts. He discusses, for example, the dilemmas
some community development corporations (CDCs) face in
exploiting development fees as a revenue source, a practice
that may sometimes induce them to undertake projects that
do not necessarily advance their missions.
Stevens, Susan K. All the Way to the Bank. (St. Paul:
The Stevens Group, Inc.) 1997.
Informed by the experiences of a well-respected financial con-
sulting firm that works with nonprofits and operates over a
dozen loan funds, this very accessible how-to guide is aimed
primarily at nonprofit managers. It covers the basics of finan-
cial planning and management, and includes a well-organized
account of various sources of capital for nonprofits, and the
character and limitations of each.
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Stevens, Susan K. “Making Working Capital Work,”
Foundation News & Commentary. July/August 2000.
This piece aims to educate funders about the need for non-
profit working capital. She contrasts working capital — a
“critical cash cushion to handle overall capacity costs, that is,
the costs required to achieve organizational competence” —
with the old-style general operating support grant — a
“budget-balancing wild card doled out by foundations as a
philanthropic allowance.” After elaborating on the purpose of
working capital, Stevens describes possible sources (internally
generated surpluses, cash reserve grants and bank loans) and
argues for more willingness by nonprofits to use debt to meet
their working capital needs.
Sussman, Carl. Building for the Future: A Guide to
Facilities Loan Funds for Community-Based Child and
Family Services. Washington, D.C.: The Finance Project.
January 2000.
This analysis is aimed at decision makers who want to assess
the potential of specialized lending programs aimed at non-
profit organizations serving children and families. After
reviewing the need for improved facilities, the author argues
that facilities funds are more feasible today than ever. (This 
is in part because of Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)
requirements and the emergence of the U.S. Community
Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund as sources
for capitalizing loan pools). He is also optimistic that facilities
funds can be an entry point for improving overall perform-
ance, as they “stimulate broader systemic changes that affect
operating income and the willingness of providers to assume
debt [and] leverage new sources of capital.” Subsidized,
alternative lenders are needed to deal with nonprofits, how-
ever, because the transaction costs and risks of lending to non-
profits, especially small ones, are unappealing to banks.
Perhaps more importantly, specialized nonprofits are needed
to create a market. Just because nonprofits need facilities capi-
tal does not mean they are generating demand for loans, in
large part because they lack the capacity to assess their needs
and options.
Tuckman, Howard P., and Cyril F. Chang. “Accumulating
Financial Surpluses in Nonprofit Organizations.”
Governing, Leading and Managing Nonprofit
Organizations, Dennis R. Young, Robert M. Hollister,
Virginia A. Hodgkinson et al (San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass) 1993.
The authors examine the positive and negative effects of
nonprofits’ accumulating financial surpluses. Accumulated
surpluses, the authors reason, can make nonprofits stronger
and more independent. In macroeconomic terms, they allow
nonprofits to develop specialized capacities. Because they use
volunteers, tend not to accumulate inventory and work at the
margins of the market, they can actually “dampen the busi-
ness cycle” by providing an oasis of stability in hard times.
On the down side, they see the possibility for inefficient use
of the resources and even for monopoly-like predatory
behaviors on the part of well-endowed nonprofits that can
edge out competitors. Asset-building can also lead to “con-
tract failure” — when, for example, a donor’s desire to affect
a social problem today by making a gift to a nonprofit is
thwarted because the nonprofit preserves the gift as part 
of its asset base. Although they argue that the benefits of
nonprofit equity accumulation are little understood, they
summarize earlier research that found most nonprofits are
accumulating surpluses. Even after weighting data from a
review of nonprofit tax filings in 1986 (which tend to over-
represent larger nonprofits), they find that the average sur-
plus of 112,000 filers was $2.5 million, and that 75 percent
of the filers reported a surplus.
Tuckman, Howard P. “How and Why Nonprofit
Organizations Obtain Capital.” Nonprofit Organizations
in a Market Economy, David C. Hammack, Dennis R.
Young, editors. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass) 1993.
This overview of nonprofit capital issues starts with the eco-
nomic case for capital: “At some point, without the addition
of further units of capital, adding one more unit of labor
leads to negative increases in a firm’s output…Thus, access
to capital is strongly related to growth in the productivity of
labor.” The author also reviews the organizational rationales
for capital, including growth and diversification; technology
and equipment acquisition; and program improvement and
innovation. After reviewing fairly conventional sources of
capital — surpluses and endowments and foundation and
government grants — he discusses the untapped potential
for nonprofits to access commercial banks as a supply of
debt capital. Industry observers estimate that only about two
to 10 percent of commercial loans are made to nonprofits for
a variety of reasons, including: unfamiliarity with nonprofits
as a market; reluctance to foreclose on nonprofits, which
might lead to adverse publicity; and the specialized nature 
of nonprofit assets (e.g., botanical gardens or rural hospitals)
that have little resale value. Also promising is tax-exempt
bond finance.
Waldhorn, Steven A., James O. Gollub, and Joyce A.
Klein, “New Approaches to Financing Nonprofit
Organizations: The Role of Lending.” The Future 
of the Nonprofit Sector, Virginia A. Hodgkinson, 
Richard W. Lyman and Associates (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass) 1989.
Based largely on a consulting assignment led by SRI
International in 1987, this piece explores how program-related
investments (PRIs) could serve as a source of working capital
for nonprofit human service organizations. The authors are
optimistic about the prospects for extending PRIs from brick-
and-mortar projects to support programmatic innovation and
adaptation. They conclude that the use of loans (as opposed 
to grants) can create new management discipline and compe-
tence among nonprofits. PRIs as working capital could sup-
port not only the development of new programs but also the
development of business opportunities that could generate
revenue for nonprofits. Some nonprofits would resist — either
on cultural grounds, or because they work in a funding envi-
ronment where repayment of PRIs would be nearly impossi-
ble. After assessing the hesitancy among funders to use PRIs
more aggressively, the authors discuss the prospects for special
intermediaries that could be created to receive and distribute
PRIs, an idea they favor.
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